NZALPA's video...............influenced many people until they actually have first hand knowledge of how the system works.
Would that include shredding documents in the navigation department, coercing people to have memory lapses, tow the company line testimony whilst under oath and altering CVR content to suit the establishment? Just to name a few. Is that
“how the system works” in your world prospector?
As for your reference about Mahon’s aviation experience. As with most of your arguments on this thread, you seem to think the more aviation experience a person has, the more he is qualified to speak on this subject. Wrong, wrong, wrong again. Using your logic, if that was true, they would have appointed an aviation expert to head the Erebus Inquiry. Muldoon thought Mahon would know “how the system works” and would find in Air NZ and his government’s favour. Alas, they miscalculated Justice Mahon’s
integrity (staying true to his moral and ethical principles),
initiative (his proactive, resourceful and persistent approach to the accident) and his
inclusion (by embracing and valuing the perspectives and contributions of all during the testimonies and investigations).
Mahon never needed any aviation experience,
he knew very well how the system worked.
Finally, prospector, if as you attest,” the Mahon report has been shown to be
incorrect in many important details, by many of his peers in the legal world, and definitely by many
people who have a great deal of aeronautical experience”.
Why did the following occur:
In 1999 the Minister of Transport, Maurice Williamson, who worked at Air New Zealand as a corporate planner at the time of the crash, tabled the Mahon report in Parliament. Williamson
argued that the time for apportioning blame was over and that he was tabling it because 'of the lessons it taught'.
On 23 October 2009
Air New Zealand CEO Rob Fyfe apologised to those affected by the tragedy for Air New Zealand's failures and for its treatment of families of the victims.
The controversy of Justice Mahon’s opinions aside, his report is most notable for its groundbreaking allocation of culpability to organisational failure. (Paragraph 393. Mahon report) This kind of conclusion was somewhat revolutionary in 1981, as identified in the chapter entitled “Erebus and Beyond” in the book Beyond Aviation Human Factors.