Hello all,
I was Nick's SQHI prior to this deployment on Herrick (I was in the process of leaving the mob at the time) so maybe I can shed some light on how TR drive failures are taught on the UK Apache fleet. It was most definitely a TR drive shaft failure (it severed mid way up the tail boom) - the TADS footage of the aircraft in flight from his wing is quite eerie with the tail rotor stationary!
In the simulator a TR drive shaft failure is given after setting up at a suitable height for autorotation with an airfield ahead - as soon as TR drive is lost the EPLs (engine power levers = throttles) are retarded to idle and the HP enters autorotation. In order to maximise the effect of the tail fin the teaching is to maintain a high run on speed. This is, of course, an ideal.
The terrain in and around the Helmand River is rough, dusty and full of wadis and other hazards. Plainly a high speed run on isn't an option!
I've flown multiple aircraft types in the AAC and I must say that one of the strengths of the training was instilling in aircrew the idea that there are many ways to achieve the same result whether that be gunnery, sensors or indeed emergencies. The FRCs tell you what you should do but, as was the case here, Nick's previous experience in Helmand and in the simulator led him and Charlie down a different path. I have to say that they handled it very well indeed and to do a low level (400ft agl) double engine off into a dusty, uneven desert environment from the front seat with minimal recent "hands on" was an exceptional feat!
To give those of you that fly smaller, lighter helicopters a flavour of performance in Afghanistan typical AUM on lift from Camp Bastion was around 19,000lbs including RCEFs (jettisonable external fuel tanks), stores booms carrying HF missiles and rockets, and around 550 rounds of 30mm carried internally in the magazine.
And the ruggedness and crashworthiness of AH is pretty awesome!
