As a non-RPT pilot who regularly makes the decision to stay home on crappy days (not that this would have been one of those days), I was thinking about the decision process regarding a) do I go to Mildura or b) autoland below minima at Adelaide.
The logical wisdom on this thread has been that continuing to Adelaide for an autoland (presumably after holding) for as long as possible would have lead to tea and biscuits.
I wonder if anyone would do things differently now compared to before this event?
The other related point that I don't think has been discussed is the decision to divert to Mildura. As I read it, from the time of deciding to divert at 0904 and 0913, both crews had a TAF for Mildura which indicated TEMPO below the alternate minima and to within 100ft of the landing minima. The report doesn't indicate if, at that point, they had enough fuel to legally plan to Mildura - i.e. with 60 minutes holding fuel or to hold until 0030/1030 (30 minutes after the TEMPO finished)
It appears that QF735 did (but maybe not as they did call fuel and push in ahead of VA1384) but it's not clear for VA1384 - they didn't hold for an hour but they also did one full missed approach which would have used some of that holding fuel. I didn't notice anywhere the report indicates how far into the fixed reserve they were.
Based on the assumption that there wasn't sufficient fuel for one or both to legally go to Mildura, the report indicates that they did based at least partly on the METAR for Mildura. Technically, I would have though that diverting to an airport for which you didn't hold legal flight plan fuel would justify a PAN PAN. Had the PAN call gone out, I can't help but wondering if the focus of ASA and BOM might have been drawn towards the situation more than it was (the NOC certainly would have woken up). If MALEE controller knew a PAN aircraft was heading for Mildura, it would be reasonable to expect that the AIREP would have been passed on immediately. If the Alert phase was up and running earlier the BOM observer at Mildura might have been aware of it and their observations might have been made earlier or sought out specifically with VA1384 in mind.
So while I agree with the sentiment that both crews were let down by three main factors - poor forecasts, exacerbated by poor information management (from ASA) once it appeared things had gone to custard and inadequate infrastructure (ILS and a working AWIS at Mildura, CAT2 at YPAD) - I think the crew of VA1394 also let themselves down by not raising with ATC (or their company?) that they were being forced to divert somewhere that they probably shouldn't have been.
Finally, I put all that together with my original thoughts - would those crews (or others) do the same again? The report calculates that both could have changed plans again and gone back to Adelaide once they received the first SPECI. What would I have done/would do?
I suspect that this report and this thread would be very different had the outcome have turned out not so well.
Other key factors which I don't think have been considered are:
1. When should VA1384 ideally have become aware of the fog at Adelaide? As I read the report, the TAF they had was the same one they planned at Brisbane with. They ended up at Mildura almost by default (although again, they could have/should have(?) made it to either Broken Hill or even Melbourne - we don't know the forecasts for these locations except that Melbourne also wasn't good but did at least have CAT2/3 infrastructure)
2. The Adelaide ATIS (via ACARS or VHF) I would have thought would have been received/receivable at or before the time they were transferred to Tailem Bend sector - potentially giving an earlier heads up to the problems ahead.
3. I've always been suspicious on the ASA policy of providing directed weather information only within an hour of ETA. Surely if a TAF amendment or observation goes to SPECI type conditions then why does my distance matter? I'm airborne and have no guaranteed access to the change. I've had this happen to me - flight plan out of Essendon on a clear TAF at Adelaide, mange to get some 3G coverage over western vic to discover a prob 30 FOG at Adelaide. Without that I too would potentially have been a VA1384 had the fog actually appeared.
UTR