@ pax b, l would agree with most of #34, except the 'vital skills in daily use' for Colgan, Asiana, AF do not relate directly to 'pure' flying skills. The dominant skill shortfall was in awareness, probably with contributions from training; stall vs unwarranted tail-stall training, knowledge of a system gotcha, reversion to a recently trained procedure.
A theme of the automation/flying debate is confidence in flying ability. Crews need to acquire and maintain confidence for a wide range of operational scenarios, but it important not to transpose passenger comfort or other operational niceties with the requirement for a safe outcome.
e.g. Whilst it is necessary for crew to practice landings in limiting crosswinds (noting the limits of simulation), it is equally important to direct this experience away from overconfidence. A critical skill is knowing when not to attempt a landing in a limiting crosswind, and what affects the 'limit'.
An alternative incident/accident analysis is required, but I would not turn to IFALPA etc for this. They or similar groups already consider the outcome and recommendations in reports more often with little questioning, resulting in general categorisations, boxes for action.
It would be more beneficial and provide a quicker response, for all operators, all individuals, to consider the reported situation seeking what can be learnt; what they can learn.
It is likely that there will be an wide range of views, probably identifying the many contributors in an accident situation. The objective is not to determine cause, blame etc, but to ask what can be learnt irrespective of the outcome. What applies to 'me', my operation, etc bearing in mind that the outcome might already be known.