Miles - I would certainly take your point about there being a choice. However when that choice turns out to be rather different than portrayed people are not unnaturally unhappy. Refusing to fly means near instant unemployment - something you are keen to experience?
As for what have I personally done? In most cases my efforts have been directly refuted by the helicopter companies - 'flying at night is no more dangerous than during the day', 'no it is not a CAP 437 helldeck but why would it be any more dangerous?' from just two items of work recently.
My ultimate clients, the oil companies generally accept the numbers but are immovable in terms of changes to contract conditions. ALARP is a great principle but they are completely resistant to anything which is not direct regulatory compliance. Given the majority are headquarter in the US this is not surprising. In the US the legal profession clear things up afterwards..... and the companies are content with that - hence lonewolf's comments above.
To 212 I would say be careful which data you use and how you compare it. Using Global figures neatly reduces all the differences. The IOGP figures for the N.Sea utilise a period when accidents rates were at a historic low - very useful for generating low risk numbers, they are now back up where they were before the middle to late 1990s. So inspite of new design aircraft, the accident rate has gone up. If you utilise the CAA figures in CAP1145 and 1036 you see a difference in 25 to 30 in fatal accident rates - but again smeared by the use of 5 year moving averages. Remove that and you get to around 80 - hence my glib use of the number 100.
But the real point is that there should be no reason that helicopter travel should not be at least as safe as it was for the period covered by the IOGP data. CAP1145 concentrated very much on the right hand side of the BowTie - catering with 'after the crash' measures. That is not the right approach.
Last edited by gasax; 26th May 2016 at 14:44.