I work in technical risk assessment for the offshore industry. When you calculate the risk which the workforce are exposed to, helicopter flying is a significant element. It depends upon the age, layout and complexity of the installation but on a modern platform the transport risk is typically 30 to 40% of the total risk.
Given the workforce have no say in the matter, or influence over it, makes them a hostage to fortune. The oil and gas industry used to boast that helicopter flying was getting safer - and they were right - until recent years, when the accident rate went back up. The oil and gas companies have tried to engage with the workforce to convince them helicopters are safe but been defeated by the accident rate!
Pilots tend to concentrate on the major component failures, but the workforce do not differentiate - pilots flying perfectly serviceable aircraft into the sea has not helped the workforces' perceptions.
When they pay to fly it is fixed wing (virtually always) and typically about 100 times safer than flying in a helicopter. Which sort of sets the scene. Whilst technically helicopters can never be as safe as fixed wing, the helicopter companies and the CAA have been pretty complacent over a non-improving accident rate. CAP 1145 was very much a reflex, certainly not a measured approach.
The longer offshore rotas (3 on, 3 off for instance) will actually change the balance of risks more toward those on the platforms than the flight risks. But it is a comparatively small community and few offshore workers do not know someone who has not been involved in at least a helicopter incident, if not an actual death. I've been in the industry for quite a while and two people I have known have died in offshore helicopters - both onboard the Chinook.
Would you buy a ticket with Malaysia Airways or Egypt Air, if you had the choice of a company with a Western European accident rate for the same money?