An excellent reply triboy.
Wire avoidance is mainly based on mapping that has known telegraph/power cables.
My take on what Distant Voice is referring to, is the general process by which MoD decides a risk is ALARP, and continues to be so. My own experience of wire avoidance is of a very short period in 1986, when the laser based detection system was first offered in response to an RAF requirement (so far, so good - this shows a major part of the process was working). It was, rightly, not the solution at that time, mainly because the kit was quite large; but in terms of distance/wire thickness, it far exceeded the RAF spec. In project management terms, the basic technology was mature, but the system integration level lagged a little. That is normal, you need a customer to come along, thus firming up the direction the design takes. In this case, for example, the warning was on a PC in a lab, but in the aircraft it was to be on the HUD.
But, and this is what DV is (I think) getting at, the obvious next step in 1986 was to consider an R&D programme with an aim of getting the SIRL to the next level. (Wasn't called SIRL then, but there was an equivalent process set out by the Chief Scientific Advisor). But nothing was done and, I assume, the Risk Registers in DEC (!! discuss) show little or no progress (as suggested in 2013 - see DV's post); whereas the underlying technology has moved on in leaps and bounds. The Safety Management System demands continuous assessment (and improvement). MoD's failure to meet this obligation lies beneath many accidents. With MoD's withdrawal, the team just applied the science to another customer's requirement, which happened to be Air Traffic Control and missile launching. About 8 years ago they were all made redundant and MoD probably doesn't even realise it owns the Intellectual Property Rights. This is a recurring theme. In 2006, the Nimrod IPT issued an Invitation to Tender to undertake a 3 year R&D programme into mitigating a safety critical risk, not knowing the aircraft office next door had had the solution in service since 1996, to a far better spec than Nimrod sought; and had then improved it in 2001. The old 1996 kit could have just been handed to Nimrod, if that's all they wanted. These are Organisational failures which accident investigations are required to assess, but seldom do. In other words, we never learn, unless you ignore orders.