three rods all of which are required to work at the same time for a successful result is a long way from the redundancy concept
With regards to failure modes/effects, "redundancy" and "single point failure" are not really the best terms to use. Like all other aircraft, rotorcraft systems/structures are designed to provide a specific level of fault tolerance (zero, single, or dual fault tolerance) based on a criticality designation for the function, classification of the failure condition (no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, or catastrophic) and the probability of the failure mode (probable, extremely remote, or extremely improbable) determined by a failure mode effects analysis (FMEA).
For example, there are numerous components on a rotorcraft, such as the main rotor shaft, performing a function designated as "critical", which have no fault tolerance (or redundancy), and the failure of which would likely be "catastrophic". But it is acceptable if a catastrophic structural failure of the component can be shown to be an "extremely improbable" event by FMEA. Of course, this is based on the fact the FMEA takes into consideration that the component will receive special analysis (fracture, fatigue, etc) during design, special QA processes during manufacture, and special monitoring/inspections during service.