Today's full flight simulators are in the high 90s percentile of actual aircraft replication and performance.
The simple truth of the matter is this. We don't need to enter a fully developed stall at either low altitude or high altitude. Except it is soon to be a regulation. A small margin beyond the 'g' break is more than sufficient. In some aircraft, fully developed stalls are unrecoverable. The CRJ for example. Most T-tails.
The FAA, courtesy of the PTS and hundreds of over zealous POIs and Check Airmen, created this stall, loss of control mess in total violation of numerous manufacturers AFM recommended stall recovery procedures, particularly with regard to loss of altitude. Specifically, when talking about 3407, flight crew PTS stall recovery standard, and Q400 AFM recovery procedure. The Captain reacted as he was trained and according to the test standard he was held to, plus or minus 100 feet. Didn't work. Did it? But let's blame him for the prang. Everyone else, run for cover.
Regulated UPRT is unnecessary. Many claim LOC control is the number one cause of general aviation accidents today. Not airline accidents, general aviation accidents. But the proof is elusive. It is becoming an increasing contributing factor in accidents, but nowhere does it appear as a single cause or even one of two causes.
We can't allow any single link in the chain to be the single most concentrated effort on a solution to improving accident probabilities. For each accident has its own distinct series of errors in the chain. Instead, we need to focus on THE single link, if one exists, that needs remedy. Meaning, the single link causing an accident varies from accident to accident.
I'm surprised professional pilots aren't voicing their collective objection over much of what is being imposed by regulators and "safety experts" these days.
Aren't we suppose to be able to vet much of this before its imposed on us or at least question the validity?
Willie
