Snakecharma,
The core issue of my last several posts is straight forward fact.
The review and evaluation of the NAS 2b "trial" was extensive and thorough, both because it should have been, and because it was so controversial, with most (but not all) of the controversy generated by the AFAP.
AIPA was notably and sensibly very restrained on the matter, with no concerns about E, and Qantas management, the DFO of the day, was supportive.
On the east coast, in early days of the trial, there were independent observers on selected flight decks.
Every "incident" filed was considered, one of the first considerations was: Is this something caused by the new procedures, or would it have happened anyway, under the old system.
For example, on the first morning, a light aircraft downwind at Port Macquarie, making "normal" radio calls was rejected as an "air miss" because it had nothing to do with the NAS 2b, and had a perfect right to be there. Likewise, an "air miss" that was opposite direction traffic at the correct level VFR was nothing to do with NAS 2b.
In the first few weeks, most of the "incidents" attributed to NAS 2b would have been funny, if it hadn't been a serious example of the unbalanced attitude of many of the reporters.
During this time, the AFAP pushed very hard the concept that "a perception of a safety problem" should be addresses as if it was a "real" safety problem, that even if many of the reported "incidents" were not "real", they should be treated as "real". Apparently, the idea of a crew worrying about a non-existent problem was just as much a threat to air safety as a real threat.
Can you really mitigate a perception?? Would an episode of MythBusters done the trick.
In other words, NAS should be canned, on the basis of a perception of a problem, even when it was comprehensively demonstrated to not be a problem. The idea of evidence based evaluation was rejected, out of hand, by self-confessed professionals. Both the NAS implementation team and review team were highly experienced and qualified.
At times, some of the meetings I attended descended to low farce.
It was not just me, QF staff pilots and AIPA pilots, as well as others present, involved in the continuous evaluation of the trial, would shake their heads in wonder at the intellectual level of the objections of some of those opposed, regardless of the facts staring them in the face.
To quote one prominent AFAP identity of the day: "I don't care how safe the FAA system is, compared to Australia, or how safe NAS 2b is, we are not going to have Dickspace in Australia".
I have already explained that I would love to be able to say what really happened, in the end, but have explained why I cannot. Just that it was "industrial" and not safety, and only involved Ansett, not Qantas or any of its subsidiaries (despite a couple of individuals in QLink absolutely opposed), or the other smaller airlines of the day, such as Flight West.
The final report of the NAS 2b trial contained NOTHING that suggested that the NAS should be "wound back".
Tootle pip!!
PS: In some ways a bit like the matter of owner drivers and road safety. Despite the lack of any statistical causal relation between owner drivers and truck accident rates in Australia, the TWU position is that owner driver are the problem, not TWU member drivers. A self- serving "perception", if there ever was one.
Last edited by LeadSled; 22nd Apr 2016 at 04:33.