The conclusion:
I find by the preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was pilot error due to the
combination of the MP’s decision to place the hard-shell NVG case forward of the yoke blocking
the flight controls, the distractions experienced by the MP and MCP during the course of the ERO,
and the misidentification of the malfunction once airborne resulting in the destruction of the
aircraft and cargo and the loss of fourteen lives.
Woow, this is like an airline investigation conclusion from 1950's, when nearly all was contributed to the infamous "pilot error". A bloody shameful conclusion, very hard to the relatives and friends, and the instructors of these poor guys.
To name a few, which moron in the organisation has erased or never introduced the need for a flight control check after an ERO of over one hour? 5 seconds during taxy out too much?
Misidentification once airborne??? those few seconds??? Who would not think of a wrong trim setting when the plane rotates by it selves and keeps on pitching up?
The decision to select an AMAX T/O was not "wrong", it was unnecessary at best. It did not CONTRIBUTE to the accident, it is highly speculative that the higher rotation speed would have triggered an abort. It would have added just a few secs during the T/O.
We are reinventing the wheel again, over and over again.
Non mil but 18.000 hrs heavy metal driver.