Recceguy you clearly have no idea what you're talking about, and therefore you represent the exact problem the industry has in dealing with this serious threat.
This is the exact same scenario as the Tarastan Airlines 737 crash in 2103. Almost exactly the same flight profile.
Here's a simple explanation of the illusion caused by confusing signals to the Otolith organs in our ears;
In aviation we are faced with the combination of rapid acceleration and reduced/no visual cues (i.e. IMC and/or night flying). As we no longer have the benefit of our visual system to resolve the ambiguity, our brain uses the signals it is receiving and interprets them as a ‘tilt’. The net result is a tilt back (i.e. pitching up) sensation under acceleration, and a tilting forward (i.e. pitching down) sensation under deceleration.
Typically this occurs during the missed approach or go-around segment of a flight at night or in IMC. Speed is slow, power is rapidly applied and the aircraft then accelerates rapidly. As no visual cues exist, this generates a strong ‘tilt back’ sensation which the pilot interprets (incorrectly) as a rapid pitching up sensation. Despite this perception the aircraft may still actually be in a level attitude or only a slight climb. This is the somatogravic illusion. The pilot will then push forward on the control column to control this (imaginary) climb thinking they are lowering the aircraft nose back to level flight, when in actual fact they are lowering the nose into a dive. As the aircraft nose lowers, the aircraft continues to accelerate, generating additional pitch up sensations, causing the pilot to lower the nose even further. Tragically, this illusion normal ends with the pilot commanding the aircraft into a high speed steep dive and contact with the ground quickly ensues.
You can't train for this "sensation experience" of this event in a simulator. The only time you'll experience it is in the real aircraft, in a very dangerous situation.
What we have to do to recognise, train for, and mitigate this particular threat is;
1. Teach crews the awareness of the effect, and when it's going to be a threat.
2. Make sure that crews brief this as a threat, (night, IMC, tired) and what they're going to do about it.
3. Use the autopilot to maximum effect during approach AND PARTICULARLY in the event of a missed approach.
4. Brief to rely on the instruments and ignore the sickening feeling of being 70+ degs nose up.
We've identified in the industry that two engine go-arounds are actually a risky manoeuvre if not managed properly. Teaching crew to hand-fly these manoeuvres is essential, but it's led crew to tend to disconnect the AP when they sense things are going wrong. In this case, they ABSOLUTELY need to rely on the autopilot (if it's working) under these circumstances.