AS.
Forget the paranoia, join the optimistic cynics club.
Consider humans as an asset, why is the design and certification as it is; we might assume that this did not plan for failure, thus what was the cause; the system, certification (beware assumptions), atmospheric situation, etc.
Consider what can be learnt for these events and similar preceding ones. Do we really have to tell pilots what is a sudden and significant change in airspeed, not to manoeuvre the aircraft with autopilot engaged (beware negative experiences with CWS).
Recovery actions are necessary, but the precursor is avoidance – macdo, but how are the conditions identified, then to be avoided by how much; what is ‘safe’?
If the conditions involve high water content then then WXR might detect them and thus avoid … but what level of intensity, deviate by how much.
If not detectable by radar … ice, or associated with CBs, then deviate, but by how much etc.
Deviation might be easier for some 787 pilots because certain engine variants have had restrictions or deviation re CB avoidance - ice crystals. So if engines had suffered in these conditions, why not airspeed.
There is much to learn from this issue, not just for the 787, but for all aircraft, operators, and individuals; how do we think about these things, learn from them and apply lessons learnt.