Gentlemen, thank you for not only an informed discussion, but one refreshingly free of hysteria and childish one upmanship.
I don't want to drive the discussion too far away from its intended purpose, but turning briefly for a moment to the specifics of the FZ accident, I would like to clarify some points.
FZ do not authorise their crew to fly dual AP approaches, so in this instance, talk of nose up trim at the point of GA would not apply. The latter stages of the approach (typically from around 1000' AGL), are hand flown, and it's reasonable to expect that this means an in trim aircraft at the point of GA. Autopilot and autothrottle are typically disengaged together.
The FZ airframe involved was fitted with 27K rated engines. My understanding is that standard GA thrust, from a single push on the TOGA button, gives 26K thrust. This is more than adequate to achieve a relatively unexciting rate of climb (between 1000-2000fpm) as previously mentioned. As the aircraft was relatively light, I would expect closer to the higher rate.
In relation to the approach prior to the accident, it is not clear exactly what the configuration of the aircraft was (flap 15 or 30), or whether the AP was still engaged or not. These could have a significant bearing on the response to the GA. We also don't know the reason for the GA, except that it took place somewhere around 1400-1500' AGL. The weather conditions were a strong, quartering headwind, with a significant increase in the lower levels above the point of GA - from some 25kts on the field to 60kts at the final altitude reached.
Purely for the purposes of discussion, I would be very interested to know the likely effect on the aircraft trim system in the following circumstances:
Autopilot engaged, final landing configuration of gear down, flap 30. At approx 1500', a hard windshear warning ("windshear, windshear, windshear" from the EGPWS). As the autopilot and autothrottle are both still engaged, the PF pushes TOGA and activates an automatic, AP coupled windshear escape manoeuvre. This will be with the full 27K thrust available.
Assuming no change of configuration, and a rapidly increasing headwind, what is the trim system going to do? How long would the STS run before potentially reaching the limit of its full authority?
If (and I mean IF), the crew misidentify an excessively long STS trim, coupled with unusually high pitch, as a trim runaway, what is the immediate aircraft response going to be on AP disconnect? How much more difficult does the situation become if the Stab Trim cutout switches are activated?
I'm embarrassed to admit, it's way beyond my current understanding. I have an idea, but that is the whole point if this thread. People have ideas, but usually grounded in an incomplete or inadequate knowledge of the system.