Dick, if you could just put the effort you pointlessly expend into crunching the numbers, as opposed to countless words based solely on opinion, you might get somewhere!
Regardless of my previous, I intuitively feel that you may have a case. But intuition just doesn't wash.
Howabout et all,
It was all done, long ago, for NAS, particularly the NAS 2b part of the plan, and all in accordance with ICAO SARPs and standards for risk analysis, both ICAO and AS/NZS.
It was/is the biggest risk analysis exercise conducted in Australian aviation history. Indeed, no changes before or since have been as extensively canvasses and consulted as the then Government's NAS policy and implementation program.
As we see here, more or less the same people opposed change in general, and in airspace management arrangements in particular then, as oppose change now.
Contrary to continual claims on pprune, the "roll back" after 12 months of successful operation had nothing to do with any general problems in the trial period, which were minimal by any measure. or the Launceston incident, (and another broadly similar north of Brisbane) no matter how sincerely some of you believe this to be the case. It was "industrial", not operational.
Mick Toller was spot on when he described Australia as:
"An aviation Galapagos, where all sorts of strange mutations have developed in splendid isolation from the rest of the aviation world".
Tootle pip!!