http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...ERO_2014q3.pdf
Not long ago Boeing released this issue of their AERO Magazine...
"Performing Safe Go-Around Maneuvers"
Is one of the topics !
They describe few cases where things went south pretty fast during a Go Around, and I quote the following:
Extreme nose-down attitude. Since 2000,
several incidents have involved extreme
nose-down attitudes during the go-around
maneuver on different types of airplanes
from different manufacturers. These inci-
dents often result from a breakdown in
correct cockpit instrument scanning. Here
are some examples:
■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
at night over the sea, at 1,000 feet
(305 meters), the PF kept a prolonged
pitch-down input resulting in a 15-degree
nose-down attitude and a dive that was
not recovered before the impact with the
sea. The amplitude and duration of the
initial reaction by the PF to the “pull-up”
warning from the ground proximity warn-
ing system (GPWS) was insufficient
(i.e., a full back stick input was required).
■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
in instrument conditions, and approach-
ing 2,500 feet (762 meters), the flight
director altitude capture mode was
activated earlier than expected by the
crew because of a high rate of climb.
The PF manually initiated a level-off
but kept a prolonged pitch-down input
that resulted in a dive that reached
an extreme negative attitude (minus
40 degrees). The PF recovered from
the dive at about 400 feet (122 meters)
above the ground with a vertical accel-
eration of 3.6 g-force (g).
■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
at night over the sea, the altitude acqui-
sition mode activated while approaching
the selected altitude and the PF pitched
down to level off. The indicated airspeed
increased toward the maximum for the
configuration. Instead of leveling off, the
PF kept a prolonged pitch-down input.
The attitude quickly decreased and
reached a negative 9-degree pitch with
a vertical speed of 4,000 feet (1,219
meters) per minute. When the GPWS
activated, the PF reacted by pitching the
airplane up. The minimum altitude was
600 feet (183 meters) over the sea. The
total duration of the event was about
15 seconds. Neither pilot could explain
the reason for the upset.
In all of these examples, pilots reacted
very late to extreme negative attitudes
displayed on both attitude director indicator
(ADI) instruments. All of these events
happened at night over a dark area or in
instrument meteorological conditions. At
the time of the upset, in the absence of
visual reference, the only attitude infor-
mation was provided by the ADIs. When
flying manually or when monitoring the auto-
pilot, the ADIs are at the center of a control
process in which pilots must detect and
then quickly and accurately correct devia-
tions from targeted values.
So... What do you guys think? The scenario here looks very close to the examples above, doesn't it?