If they had a lower altitude set in the window, e.g. the published miss of 2260 feet, as they climbed to FL80, would the autothrottles come alive and pull the power back to idle as they zoomed upward in manual flight past the window altitude? This is what happens in some of the so called EFIS Boeings.
Does the Misap procedure for Rostov contain a hard altitude in the FMC? Or maybe they set the MCP altitude to a lower altitude than FL 080. A manual go around followed by a flight director level off, thrust cutback to reduce to speed at altitude capture, pitch down, confusion and ...
Looks like the GA altitude had been set on MCP instead of 8000 ft with in manual flight.
Yep, a very real possibility that the published missed approach altitude (2250 feet or 2260 feet depending on the chart maker) was somehow set in the window even though ATC said 'roger' to the climb to FL80.
And, ManaAdaSystem's question about the hard missed approach altitude in the FMS sure sounds pertinent. Even with 8000 feet in the window the autothrottles and flight director would still see the altitude constraint in the box if they were engaged in a vertical navigation mode.
In the opinion of line pilots, is there anything especially unusual about announcing to climb to FL80 after a go-around rather than the normal 2250 (or 3240) ft?
Great transcript, thanks for doing it.
About the only thing I would normally do differently is phrase the climb to FL80 as a request. And a climb to FL80 in a light airliner would normally be more comfortable than leveling 2000 feet off the ground as long as things went well.
I overfly Russia but don't land there so I'm not sure what would be customary. Some places in South America you are pretty much on your own as far as ATC and you are expected to tell the controller what you are going to do next.
I might be wrong here, but listening to the transcript, was there confusion between QFE and QNH? ( 998 & 988 )
I don't think so, the crew explicitly read back only the QNH numbers. There is a gotcha that I've experienced on other Boeings where you are in an altitude capture mode and make a large altimeter setting change, say going from QNH to QNE as you would in this case on the missed approach to FL80. Twisting the altimeter knob as you start to level off can induce a noticeable pitch excursion.
Another update on the analysis of the flight and voice recorders:
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) informs that the investigation team keeps working at the accident site. Today the examination of the site of the aircraft air collision is conducted, the wreckage map is constructed, the aircraft fragments' recovering is almost completed. The IAC specialists together with UAE representatives analyze the radar surveillance data, the flight crew-ATC communications, and the weather information.
On March 21st NTSB (USA) experts together with the Boeing experts will join the investigation.
The IAC Laboratory experts together with UAE and BEA (France) representatives have performed the preparation works on the extraction of the memory modules from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) crash-protected cases, as well as the data readout. The preliminary analysis shows that the recorder was operational in flight, and was recording the flight data till the aircraft ground collision. The quality of recording is satisfactory. The experts start the recording data decoding and analyzing.
The Cockpit Data Recorder (CVR) shows the mechanical damages. In course of these damages the data cable was destroyed. The X-ray radiographic examination of memory module and interface cable was performed. The interface cable recovering, as well as the module non-volatile memory state examination are continued.