We do. You just need to read page 15 of the AAIB special bulletin to give an actual number and the metrics used.
But we miss the point. In the end risk and its management have all be defined by the regulator. The principle document that related to air display was CAP 403, it is mature, being as it was in its 13th version. We can all read so there is no need to restate the points made in the same AAIB SB as referenced above.
We can argue it differently and/or believe that the 13th edition of CAP403 was not as we would like it but that is beside the point after the event.
What we might take away from the emerging accepted facts - if we can agree that the AAIB reports establish them - is that the narrative hasn't revealed a "magic bullet" that explains all with some 1 in a million engineering failure. So far it has followed that tired old path (which for want of a better term) has complacency and human error front and centre.
We will never know how and if this event could have been captured earlier because those who are closest to this - including the CAA - kept no data. Hence why the 2014 JP incident is of focus purely because it is within memory - but who knows what is or who else was doing what earlier?
Regardless what this thread increasingly demonstrates is there are those who fail to engage and speak up because...well who knows? Some loyalty to kindred spirits, old pals, whatever you choose to class them as or even define "them" as.
The "wait for the final report", the "disgusted" at those who hold opinion, the trolling, the having a chip and the "who are you and what do you fly" calls start to lack credibility and become themselves rediculous when so much of what was said earlier proves not to be wild speculation but accurate - and not because of any special genius but very often by being able to see what is hidden in plain sight.