EAP86. Well said. I think this an opportune time to remind us of the events behind the two accidents I mentioned that occurred on 22 March 2003.
Sea King – The BoI’s 3 main contributory factors were predictable, and predicted in late 1994. Mitigation plans were drawn up, properly approved and fully funded (one of them was nil cost, the other two mandated policy and funded anyway). Almost immediately (December 1994), DOR(Sea) stated the nil cost one was not to be implemented. I know this, because I was writing the specs that had to be amended. This created a huge difference in form, fit, function and use between AEW Mk2 and what became ASaC Mk7, and is in part what forced the change of Mark number. While the spec reflected the OR decision, the design contract asked that both designs be undertaken, as it was assumed common sense would prevail. It didn’t.
Of the other two, one contract was cancelled in 1998, without replacement, by a non-technical official who had self-delegated technical and airworthiness authority. That is, he deemed the risk not to exist at all, despite the world and its dog saying it did. The last was cancelled by the same official in 2000. This was a safety design issue and he directed that mandated design regs be ignored.
In risk management terms the 3 main defences in depth against the risk (collision) were torn down and cast aside, without replacement; leaving the “accident trajectory” unimpeded. But there was a final defensive barrier to the RN seeing this unsafe build standard – the Critical Design Review. The same official paid the contract milestone for the CDR a week early, then waived the CDR. Boscombe’s formal complaint refers to outstanding safety case issues and critical safety mods. That is, the work remained to be done, but the money was gone. Even so, and with the programme manager’s support, Westland refused to obey the illegal instruction to ignore the regs, as they always do. The official then took it out of Westlands and the PMs hands, sent in an MoD working party and modified the aircraft with an unapproved and unsafe mod. The first trials aircraft was at the safe build standard, the remainder not. MoD denies this, despite pictorial evidence taken by Westland (who aren’t stupid and know when to gather evidence to defend future actions).
What I have described is fraud. It was actively concealed from the BoI and Coroner. The investigation it was notified was halted in February 2004, and MoD now deny it took place despite the evidence submissions being freely available.
Tornado ZG710 – The main engineering contributory factor noted by the BoI, and which in the opinion of the senior Reviewing Officer would have prevented the accident, was notified by Boscombe in 1998; and rejected by the same 2 Star who ignored the above ASaC issues. (Same person as Nimrod, Chinook, Lynx….). This was upheld by the same 4 Star, CDP, in 2001. Both in written rulings, on numerous occasions following appeals. In 2002 a further 2 Star, XD5, also rejected the recommendation for a fleet inspection, which would have revealed the non-compliance with design regs. His Military Advisor, a Major in the Royal Scots, went to great lengths to fight the aircrews’ side, to no avail. That an infantry officer had to do this is a terrible indictment. The same official as above was involved, telling the project office to ignore the specialist engineering advice from Boscombe and aircraft project managers. There was a conscious decision to render the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire.
I was going to ask what the MAA has done that would have prevented this. But I know the answer, because they have consistently supported the decisions; including briefing Ministers against the specialist engineer who identified and notified all the above risks, on both aircraft. If they really wanted to, they might, just might, make a 2 Star think twice. But as they are not independent I suggest they will continue to support 4 Star and Ministerial decisions that what I describe does not constitute “wrongdoing”. I’m afraid those are the hard, verifiable facts. Of the 9 dead, I knew 3 very well, so feel I have a small personal interest. I know the mother of one, to whom I spoke only the other day, remains utterly distraught, especially at this time of year. She can accept her son died in action. It is the lies and deceit by MoD she cannot bear. The outright lie by a senior RN officer that mandated design regulations are merely “recommendations” and can be ignored at will. JSP553, Military Airworthiness Regulations. The clue is in the name.
Front line should never hear of these attaining and maintaining problems. But as matters stand, the root problem has been ignored and operational commanders have been told to deal with it. That is abrogation on a grand scale. Show me an operational commander who has direct influence over any of the above.