cessnapete, I've never even hinted at banning overflight of all public; your assertion that I have is incorrect.
Trying to get this back on track, I trust we all agree this is about risk assessment. It is my opinion that the risk assessment for Shoreham was flawed (air display overflight of an active road - the A27), for all the reasons previously stated. Tourist is correct in that we cannot remove all risk but we are in the business of managing it. We simply cannot say "accidents happen, move on, nothing to see".
For sure, if we take a standard risk matrix (likelihood vs. consequence) we can assess the likelihood as absolutely nothing thus giving a nice 'green' result. However, we know that air show accidents do happen at a rate higher than other general aviation accidents and therefore there is an increased risk (i.e. above background noise) associated with such accidents. That takes us on to consequences and under any definition multiple deaths would fall into a 'catastrophic' category. Rattling all that down, a basic RA matrix would result in an unacceptable (red) outcome unless a mitigation was put in place. Aside - I'm talking basic safety management principles here but hopefully the message makes sense.
So, we need to find middle ground in how to manage risk. As stated, I'm not an advocate of complete banning of overflight of the public, nor am subscribing to continuance as stands for another 60 years, wholly relying upon the likelihood side of a RA model. I am saying that Shoreham demonstrated a weakness in oversight and risk assessment.
In August 1998 I sat in a Puma helicopter providing ad-hoc medieval after the Ramstein airshow disaster. The industry made significant changes, for the better, after that event. At what point should we wake up and re-assess how we do business - one death, eleven, 40? As a safety manager for a significant AOC organisation, I am absolutely sure that we cannot maintain the status quo.