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Old 18th Mar 2016, 07:21
  #26 (permalink)  
tucumseh
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: uk
Posts: 3,227
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EAP86

Thank you for your considered reply. I think we are in agreement. The point you make;

UK MAA seem to have been swayed by the consideration of what might happen in times of conflict
echoes mine. This is the fitness for purpose argument. There is (seemingly) little understanding that one must first attain airworthiness, and so by definition have a robust process for maintaining airworthiness, before an aircraft is ever in theatre. Airworthiness is a pre-requisite to being in a position of having to make a FFP decision.

Companies like Westland tend to do most of the "attaining" bit very well. MoD has cancelled its only mandated Def Stan setting out the procedures for "maintaining" and no longer teaches the subject. (And because we have sold our workshops, there are no apprentices to teach). Many at the top consider it a waste of money - hence the savings at the expense of safety. It follows the FFP decision at front line cannot be a truly informed one, because he baseline is missing, or at best a moving feast. There is a honking great black hole in the middle.

That is my simplistic explanation, but it is clear where the gap is. It was identified in the late 80s by MoD auditors. It was reiterated umpteen times by Director of Flight Safety between 1992 and 1998. By 2000 most had just given up, and airworthiness depended largely on companies ignoring their contract and instead implementing regulations.

Rigga is right about SQEP/experience. Why is a 2 year post acceptable now, when an unbroken 10-15 years was required before? That is dumbing down. The one thing I'd say about the MAA though - they seem to have taken onboard the root cause of a number of fatal accidents - non-technical staffs being allowed to self-delegate airworthiness authority. I'd say that is their biggest success so far, but I don't like the fact that those who did, and caused so many deaths, are still in post in MoD's upper echelons. It would seem the MAA has no retrospective powers, so let us hope these people have the decency not to set foot in an aircraft project office again. 13th anniversary of two of the examples next week (22nd).
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