Yes, I read that at the time. I don't want to get into personalities, as the report acknowledges MAA's difficulties with SQEP (but, like H-C, studiously avoids the reason, which gets you VERY close to the root failures and culprits), but if you map the H-C recommendations against MAA actions there is very little correlation. Nor, with respect, do any of the named MoD staff in the report (with one possible exception) have any experience in the practical implementation of the regulations designed to prevent the failures in the first place. That is not their fault - the majority are simply not trained or employed to do the job, in the same way I'm not trained to be a pilot. The nett result is most confuse airworthiness, serviceability and fitness for purpose; talking mainly of the last. You can see this in the very basic errors in many MAA documents, that no MoD Technical Agency would be expected to make. These errors mean some important regs disappear off at a tangent, leading to (e.g.) the observations above by Crab. The simple example I always use is getting the definition of the process that maintains the safety case wrong: which, after all, was what H-C spent 580-odd pages on. In fact, the definition used is essentially the same as DPP(PM) used in 1993 when drafting the ill-fated CDPIs, which were (in part) to replace Controller Aircraft Instructions. The problem of course was, the perfectly good CAIs were cancelled, but so were the CDPIs when they were exposed as crap (by the same Directorate in charge of Chinook, ironically; which in turn illustrates the state of play long before H-C's 1998 nonsense). That left very little advice for new staff, compounded in 1996 by CDP's decision just to do away with engineering staffs. Sorry, I just see all these links because I've had to deal with the fallout. The MAA have a difficult task, not of their own making, and I wouldn't like to work there. Not because I couldn't do the job. But because I wouldn't be allowed to to the job properly.