It is quite astonishing that the FDD 'was not provided with or was not aware of the display sequence.'
This seems to be a root cause of the August 2015 accident.
If the (very experienced) Flying Display Director had known that the aircraft was about to enter a loop, then seeing that it was too low to start such a manoeuvre, he could have called a STOP.
Which begs the following questions:
1. Why did the CAA initially accept and then quietly sweep under the carpet AAIB Safety Recommendation 2009-052:
"It is recommended that the UK Civil Aviation Authority requires that the sequence of manoeuvres for a flying display is clearly specified in advance of the display and provided to the display organiser and that the sequence is practised prior to displaying to the public"?
2. Which CAA staff drafted this amendment for Edition 11 of CAP 403 in 2009:
"the Flying Display Director is charged with circulating, prior to the event a written brief to all participants which will include details of manoeuvres to be flown at the event that are known and have been practised…"?
3. Which CAA staff then decided to omit the proposed amendment from Edition 11 (and all subsequent editions)?
4. Was this
volte face approved at CAA board level or by other senior management?
In theory, there should still be a "paper trail" for all this for interested parties to follow.