Part 2 of 4
Rules-Based Behaviors
Rules-based behaviors are behaviors for which a routine or a specific procedure has been developed, learned, and used by the pilot. Using a checklist or following a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are excellent examples of rules-based behaviors. A focus on such behaviors allows even moderately skilled pilots to operate an airplane both safely and efficiently in most situations and environments. Rules-based behaviors do not require that the behavior be memorized or internalized. Here, it is the “rule” or the “procedure” that is memorized. For example, what the pilot must know regarding a specific activity for dealing with a pre-flight inspection or a pre-takeoff procedure is that he or she must make use of a standardized checklist or an accepted and memorized procedure. The key focus of rules-based behaviors is the focus on standardized procedures: i.e., “if this gage reads this number or lower, you must turn this switch to ‘ON,’ and rotate that knob to this position.”
Rules-based behaviors provide a tried and true framework for the application of skills. They are typically based on long developed and tested knowledge and experience. The history of errors and successes resulting from years and years of experience form the basis for procedures designed to prevent future errors and guide future successes. Rules-based behaviors make up a generous portion of flight operations and pilot training for excellent reasons. This is particularly true when flying in a multi-crew environment. In such an environment, unless standardized procedures are established and followed, chaos would reign supreme. The standardization of functions that are necessary (all of which are highly structured and standardized) define the actions that are to be taken; by whom they are to be taken; the order in which they are accomplished; and even the communications between crew members. This assists greatly toward achieving an efficient and safe flight.
Knowledge-Based Behaviors
The potential weakness when operating under a rules-based behavior system occurs when there is an initial misdiagnosis of a problem or situation and the wrong procedure is applied. The successful implementation of rules-based behaviors requires sufficient skill-based behaviors and the required knowledge to know when particular procedures should be applied – bringing us to the third category of behaviors – knowledge-based behaviors. These behaviors apply in situations where a decision must be made regarding which specific rule must be applied or when no specific rule or procedure has been established. Said differently, this is where pilots depend on decision making, relying on their own, personal knowledge, tempered with what experience they have, to effectively address particular situations. Knowledge-based solutions often appear to be the highest form of problem solving. Unfortunately, such behavior is subject to a wide range of human errors. Getting “creative” in a difficult situation can lead, and often does lead, to making a situation worse rather than better.
At any given moment pilots only know what they can see, hear, feel, and most importantly, recognize. Any decisions made, must be made on those bases. The basic characteristics of human thought is to structure information and then make inferences from that structure. If the assessment made is accurate, and if appropriate knowledge and understanding of rules and procedures are applied, the probability is that the resulting skill application will result in a successful outcome. A significant issue that often has a determining influence on any such outcome is that the information structuring process tends to occur very early when assessing a situation. If that structuring seems to make sense, if all the parameters seem to fit with all the information available, humans, particularly pilots (as they are more often in a dynamic and potentially dangerous situation) are more than likely to believe the framework created is correct. Therefore, any subsequent information entering the equation – particularly if that subsequent information seems to contradict the framework that has been created – humans (and thereby pilots, primarily because of the urgency of their situation) tend to exclude or disregard that “new” information.