Airbus old accident

[AirRabbit]

I also have no desire to disrespect commenters to this thread, nor to disrespect either of the pilots involved in the Kegworth accident, and I think it’s completely appropriate to include a review of the events prior to and during this particular accident sequence. However, from what I understand from reading the report of the Kegworth accident, it seems as though the critical decision to shut down the ‘thought-to-be’ malfunctioning engine was made after incorrectly identifying the problem based exclusively on what was believed to be an ‘understanding’ of the air conditioning/pressurization airflow, rather than identifying the malfunctioning engine on the basis of engine indications. Apparently, there was no attempt of determine the cause of the ‘sudden pounding noise’ nor an attempt to locate the source of the ‘severe vibrations;’ both of which were apparently accompanied by a higher-than-normal fuel flow to that engine.

While it is completely logical to review the “traditional CRM” issues that were absent, I think the facts of this specific accident equally point to a strikingly absent attempt to include a serious examination of the engine indications – ALL of the indications – prior to determining that shutting down what should have appeared to be an apparently normally operating engine was the course of action to follow. I understand that the ‘new’ engine vibration instruments were smaller and had a different ‘look,’ but there is no indication that either crew member attempted to identify the offending engine by a comparison of the remainder of ALL the prominently displayed engine instruments – with which, one would think, both crew members were substantially familiar – including the fuel flow indications, which, apparently, would have been seen to be different, due to the auto-throttle adjustment attempt to maintain normal RPM after separation of the fan blade.

Of course, my focus has regularly been (and will likely continue to be) the training that crew members receive initially and (hopefully) regularly thereafter. Such training should regularly be on ALL of the normal operating procedures AND the procedures to be followed when something goes awry. And such procedures should include, and be regularly reviewed, how the decision to shut down an engine on an airborne airplane is to be made, and what procedures should be followed for that decision to be carried out.