I can only speak from the long haul perspective, but I suspect that on this type of ops and being so far from home in the days of poor coms in many parts of the world, our system worked far better than the S/O s in the FE panel. I saw many a US carrier get themselves in trouble due to poor system knowledge and operational knowledge including one major US carrier who ended up with all the fuel in one tank on a Pacific crossing. Now that was an interesting inter aircraft discussion. At least they paid for our beers that night in Narita.
Over on the Boeing side, I remember United had a fuel emergency at Narita in the late 1980's on a 747. Somehow the FE had trapped fuel in a tank, maybe due to boost pump failures. There was an old alternate procedure to move the fuel using the jettison manifold. Unfortunately, the FE was a pilot and she hadn't been taught this workaround. Two engines flamed out in the air and a third quit after landing at NRT. Or so a professional flight engineer told me at the time. Does this sound right?
If the incident Wunwing refers to was a US carrier arriving into Narita with 12000 Kgs of fuel in one tank and nearly none in any other tank I knew of it, but no detail. My understanding was that the airman occupying the FE position was in fact a pilot whom had no engineering background. Lack of system knowledge was a factor in that following a cross-feed valve failure nobody knew how to utilize the refuel-dump system to overcome the problem.
This seems to be the incident we remember, looks like they actually were down to one engine on final approach to NRT
:
NTSB Identification: DCA88IA056
The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 40452.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of UNITED AIRLINES
Incident occurred Monday, May 02, 1988 in NR TOKYO, Japan
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/25/1990
Aircraft: BOEING 747-123, registration: N157UA
Injuries: 258 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various sources and may not have traveled in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft incident report.
UNITED FLT 97 EXPERIENCED INDICATIONS OF UNEVEN FUEL FLOW FROM MAIN TANKS 2 AND 3 AT FL360 BEGINNING ABOUT 4- HOURS AFTER DEPARTURE ON AN 11-HOUR TRANSPACIFIC FLIGHT. THE FUEL SYSTEM HAD BEEN SET UP FOR ALL ENGINE FEED FROM THE NOS 2 AND 3 TANKS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS LATER ESTABLISHED THAT THE NUMBER 2 CROSSFEED VALVE FAILED IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE S/O INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE INTRANSIT LIGHT HAD ILLUMINATED WHEN THE VALVE SELECTOR WAS MOVED TO THE CLOSED POSITION - INDICATING NORMAL CROSSFEED VALVE OPERATION. FUEL SYSTEM PROBLEM WAS MISDIAGNOSED AS A PROBLEM OF FAULTY FUEL GAGE INDICATIONS. FUEL MONITORING INDICATED INSUFFICIENT FUEL FLOW FROM NO 2 TANK WHEN CROSSFEEDING. ENGS 1, 3, AND 4 FLAMED OUT WHEN FUEL WAS EXPENDED FROM ALL TANKS EXCEPT NO 2. EMERGENCY DESCENT WAS MADE TO DESTINATION TOKYO-NARITA AIRPORT. CREW REPORTED THEY USED FLAPS-20, BUT DFDR SHOWED FLAPS-1 WAS USED FOR LANDING. 3 TIRES BLEW ON LANDING. ALL 3 FLIGHTCREW QUALIFIED IN THE B-747 IN THE 13-MONTHS BEFORE THE INCIDENT.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
• FLUID,FUEL..STARVATION
• FUEL SYSTEM..IMPROPER USE OF..FLIGHT ENGINEER
• PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
Contributing Factors: • FUEL SYSTEM..FAILURE,PARTIAL
• LOWERING OF FLAPS..IMPROPER..PILOT IN COMMAND
• FUEL SYSTEM,CROSS-FEED VALVE..MOVEMENT RESTRICTED
• LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH AIRCRAFT..FLIGHT ENGINEER
• LACK OF TOTAL EXPERIENCE IN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT..PILOT IN COMMAND
• CREW/GROUP COORDINATION..INADEQUATE
Full narrative is not available