John,
I concur with your assessment in the case of a "thinking" pilot. I am aware of your extensive FT background and a refusal above scheduled V1 in such circumstances is exactly what I would expect anyone with a test background to do - accepting the inevitable overrun in a limiting accel stop situation.
However, and this is the ONLY reason I raised the issue, the great majority of line pilots do not have the benefit of the sort of background which you, and others of similar ilk, have. In particular, they don't have the exposure to unusual handling situations requiring rapid and novel solutions.
Many, it seems, have precious little knowledge of matters outside their specific directed training.
In addition, the line pilot is subjected to a barrage of rote training in respect of when he should stop and when he should go, leading to a potential problem in respect of expectation.
Simulator observations over a period of time with a range of line pilots (including some with very significant experience in terms of hours) indicate to me that the line reality may be very different to what the TP would sensibly do.
Many, and possibly most(?), line pilots, because of a startle factor and expectation, may (and I suspect, will) keep going, initially, in spite of the clearly obvious outcome. The short window of opportunity to refuse is, in such a circumstance, quite critical.
My interest in this topic is to provoke some thought amongst the airline training people about a little area which can present a big surprise to the unsuspecting pilot.
I readily admit that I don't know whether I am seeing a bigger problem than might exist in reality. It just seems appropriate to me that the flight standards training implications ought to be canvassed.
Hence my comment in the earlier post that ...
"..this is one of those times when being go-oriented might not be the best risk averse option..."
[This message has been edited by john_tullamarine (edited 31 May 2001).]
[This message has been edited by john_tullamarine (edited 31 May 2001).]