So the account on post #26 was wrong on several counts:
The jump most certainly was planned to freefall to terminal velocity.
The plan was to deploy at 5000 ft AGL after a 4000 ft freefall. (Typical planning)
A 5000 ft AGL pull altitude would have given lots of margin for multiple errors. (Good planning.)
The tragedy was not a result of altimeter error due to cold.
The cause was hypoxia of the jumpers. (Very very bad planning and a major violation of the Skydiver's Information Manual.)
The three dead jumpers never used oxygen during the climb.
The three that died did not pull "too late." They never pulled at all.
None of the dead jumpers had auto deploy devices (moderately bad planning, but not a violation.)
The three surviving jumpers all used oxygen at least part time during the climb by sharing a single portable O2 bottle with the pilot. (bad planning and a violation, but just good enough to survive, if just barely.)
The lone surviving single jumper had an auto deploy device and it fired. (good planning.)
The other two survivors jumped tandem, did not suffer hypoxia and manually pulled as planned at 5000 ft AGL. (good planning)
Still a tragic event, but very different than what was originally described.
Also very very different than what the Russians did. No comparison at all between the antarctic tragedy and the Russian arctic jump.