Comunque...per ritornare al tema in oggetto e fornire maggiori elementi al fine di poter dar luogo ad "una critica più mirata" (e quindi efficace), ritengo sia necessario riassumere quanto segue:
1) Dopo l'incidente di Lubitz chi è che ha "reagito"?
La Commissione Europea
2) Cosa ha fatto inizialmente la Commissione Europea?
Ha istituito una task force per esaminare l'incidente
3) Da chi è stata costituita la task force?
The Task Force brought together 14 senior representatives from airlines, flight crew associations (ECA), medical advisors and authorities. The chairmanship was assured by Patrick Ky, EASA Executive Director. Additional presentations and contributions were delivered by invited experts and representative bodies.
4) Cosa ha fatto la task force a seguito della sua investigazione?
Ha emanato 6 raccomandazioni di sicurezza, fatte pubblicare da EASA, la prima delle quali sancisce la presenza costante di almeno 2 persone in cockpit per l'intera durata del volo
5) Quali sono state le motivazioni addotte per aver posto in essere tale decisione?
The 2-persons-in-the-cockpit-procedure was introduced by airlines in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks to ensure the monitoring of the area in front of the cockpit without the pilot leaving the seat prior to the installation of a camera system to perform this task. A number of airlines on both sides of the Atlantic continued to apply the two persons in the cockpit procedure at all times, even after the installation of camera surveillance systems.
Following initial information available after the Germanwings accident, EASA issued on 27 March 2015 a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB)3 temporarily recommending that airlines re-assess the safety and security risks associated with flight crew members leaving the flight crew compartment during non-critical phases of flight. Based on this assessment, airlines should ensure that at least two crew, including at least one qualified pilot, are in the cockpit at all times of the flight or implement other equivalent mitigating measures. The EASA recommendation has been widely implemented.
The Task Force has analysed possible additional risks stemming from the 2-persons-in-the-cockpit recommendation, including but not limited to the possibility that it allows access of additional persons to the flight deck.
The Task Force notes that the procedure has been extensively used by airlines in many countries prior to the EASA recommendation and no issues have been reported because of it. EASA was not aware of any reported incidents due to a member of cabin crew being on the flight deck. EASA also reported on the FAA’s information that it was unaware of any known related security or safety incidents.
A number of airlines have implemented supplemental measures to complement the requirement. Crew may be subject to additional security screening, and temporary staff excluded from the task. In addition, training may be provided so that crew are fully aware of the requirements of the role, which is limited to facilitating the opening and closing of the cockpit door.
The Task Force takes note of the positive reaction from the general public to the implementation of the 2-persons-in-the-cockpit-recommendation.
Taking into account the possible safety benefits, the public’s confidence in and acceptance of the measure and the current widespread application, the Task Force determined that the 2-persons-in-the-cockpit recommendation should be maintained.
Nevertheless, the application of the recommendation should be monitored and evaluated one year after publication of this report. Operators should ensure that appropriate measures are used to mitigate any new risk. The measures could incluinclude additional training for crew asked to enter the cockpit and tasking only selected crew with this role.
Se queste sopra sono le motivazioni addotte, ritengo che su queste debbano fondarsi le controdeduzioni.
Spero possa essere stato di aiuto.