Use and Fidelity of Simulations
PhilipG,
Perhaps I can help shed some light here.
Unfortunately, your example of the F-35C tail hook is a little off beam. The simulator process on F-35C certainly looked at the ability of the aircraft to approach the carrier in a controlled way at the required speed and sink rate. (Plus lots of other stuff) Engagement with the arresting wire was assumed, because (and this is important) there is no way of reliably simulating the engagement of a moving hook with a deck wire.
This is why a deliberate series of physical tests were planned and carried out to check hook/wire engagement. The F-35C's problem was found on the first series of tests (low speed taxying into the wires). The fixes were developed and re-tested, leading to successful hook/wire engagements on board. This is not an unusual issue - a number of naval aircraft have encountered hook or landing problems. Taking the wire is a hard thing to do, and that's why the USN relied on physical tests, not simulations.
With modern combat aircraft that rely on a large number of factors to achieve success (including signature. complex weapons and data linkages), and the massive increases in simulation capability, the role of simulations has increased. Indeed, in some areas (e.g. defensive aids systems) the ONLY way that a system can be really tested is via some form of simulation (often called 'hardware in the loop').
In the USA, DOT&E has a lot of clout, and its business is (mostly) conducted in public. It would be nice if the UK had an independent OT&E system (it doesn't) and the results were aired in public (they most definitely aren't). That would stop some of the shenanigans that have taken place in the UK in the last few years, (that I can't reveal in open forums) to achieve a supposed 'IOC'.
It's not a binary case of 'simulation bad' or 'real world testing good'. There are good reasons to use simulations, and good reasons to question the outputs. Like most aspects of combat aircraft development, you use all the tools available.
I remember analysing the UK's simulation of air to air gun engagements, which was so badly set up that it was giving ridiculous results. Sadly, the results were accepted as 'truth' and influenced the decision to delete the Typhoon's gun. As ever it's 'garbage in garbage out'.
MSOCS is bang on the money. Simulations give an indication, the actual data and results are very highly classified, and much of what is going on here (both pro and anti) is 'forum chatter'. What is avoidable and rather sad is that much of this chatter is aggressive and personal in nature. Which is why I now seldom post.
Best regards as ever to those sorting the data, making the decisions, and working the programme.
Engines