All this discussion about pilot error misses what is, to me, the real elephant in the room.
IMVHO, Shoreham is primarily a risk management failure.
Pilots, however well trained, experienced or current, occasionally make mistakes (and I'm not saying that happened here). This was known before Shoreham.
Airframes, engines & systems, however well tested, certified and maintained, occasionally fail (and once again I'm not saying that happened here). This was also known before Shoreham.
If either of these failures occur during a low level aerobatic display, the result could be a high energy impact with the ground. This, too, was known before Shoreham (and has happened with somewhat alarming frequency in the recent past).
Any persons unfortunate enough to be in close proximity to such a high energy impact are likely to be killed or seriously injured. Again, this was known before Shoreham.
It's possible to argue that a truly objective risk analysis prior to the event may have shown that the combined probability of all of the above holes lining up was simply too great to be acceptable, given the potential consequences.
There is a danger when conducting risk analysis to start with the assumption that an event should take place, and to put the case together in such a way as to justify the desired outcome, rather than to accept what the analysis is objectively saying. The best example I know of is the risk analysis which was conducted on the events leading up to the Challenger disaster, which was subsequently shown to be seriously flawed and to wholly underestimate the probability of a catastrophic event.
In the case of Shoreham, it's perhaps about believing the chances of a major disaster happening are one in a million years, when real world experience now shows the reality may be that it's one in 66 years or so.
Last edited by Sillert,V.I.; 15th Feb 2016 at 14:35.