AF447 has been, and continues to be debated with polarising views between man and machine.
Many posts reflect the difficulties in avoiding hindsight bias and the need for systems thinking, whereby complex interactions in accidents appear simpler to explain via individual contributors, and thus each becomes a basis for a solution. Often there is focus on the actual event, overlooking the hidden, latent precursors.
Life, aviation, and accidents are rarely simple. Accidents involve many contributing factors, each necessary, but where none in isolation may be sufficient to cause it.
A bold reversal of the latter is that no one factor will be assured of preventing future accident with the degree of certainty often stated.
We have a natural dislike of uncertainty and complexity, which can lead to inaccurate simplifications. Modern safety initiatives seek to manage this; the need to change the way we think about safety, the role of the human, what is error, operational expectations vs actually, and the ability to learn from accidents, incidents and events.
Such a change requires us to accept that nothing is certain, and how individually and collectively we might manage uncertainty. Rarely can we identify a single dominating (proven) factor in accidents; alternatively groups or patterns of contributions might indicate areas of interest according to viewpoint.
Safety improvements reside in what can be learnt and applied; a reactive start, seeking proactive improvement. This requires all management levels to be involved, regulator, operator, pilot.
Everyone should have something to learn - what if, why. Questions are easy to think of, but not so easy pose in context, with prior consideration of what is meaningful in operations. Also, a bottom up approach, where pilots question operators, operators question regulators, may be time consuming, and against the flow of safety management.
Alternatively, a top down approach could provide greater benefit where the regulator / operator consider what is ‘meaningful’ according the front line actors.
Safety in an industry often reflects its management – it regulation.
The thought examples in
http://www.pprune.org/9242725-post116.html #116 do not seek agreement or otherwise – contributors or solutions – each depends on viewpoint, context, mind-set, but if they do relate to current operations then they could be the basis of safety improvement.
Each of us needs to challenge and provoke our beliefs, where these thoughts might collectively (all of us) provide some insight of what is required. The outcome might only require small, well-reasoned and affordable changes, spanning many subjects, but remembering that uncertainty reigns, it necessitates judgement.
What might we learn?