Per tutti quelli che non hanno tempo e voglia di sciorinarsi tutte le 372 pagine del ‘Report’, ecco una cronistoria succinta del volo in esame.
Innanzitutto anche se sia lungi da me qualsiasi malevola intenzione di insinuare alcunché…:
The
‘Final Draft Report’ of the occurrence investigation
was completed in July 2015. In accordance with the procedures, it was reviewed at ASC’s 35th Council Meeting on 29 July 2015 and then sent to relevant organizations and authorities for comments. After comments were collected and integrated, the English version of the investigation report was reviewed and approved by ASC’s 39th Council Meeting on 24 November 2015. The Chinese version of the investigation report was first reviewed by ASC’s 40th Council Meeting on 29 December 2015. With the approval of ASC’s 41st Council Meeting on 26 January 2016,
both final reports were published on 29 January 2016.
Il Trans Asia 222:
Scheduled: 0h:40’; Espected Flt time: 0h:30'? T.O.: 17:45! ATO Penghu island at 18:11; Crash: 19:06 (dopo 1h:21')
Azzardo una stima del T.O. Fuel:
Trip 30'+ Hold 30'+ Alt (back home) 30'+ extra = 1h:30’+ extra
(Alle 18:40 il CM-2 dichiara
:” Fuel quantity three seven three, sigh”)
@MARCHESE: Ci dici per favore l'autonomia residua?
During the final approach, the runway 20 runway visual range (RVR) values decreased from 1,600 meters to 800 meters and then to a low of about 500 meters. The RVR information was not communicated to the occurrence flight crew by air traffic control. Such information might influence the crew’s decision regarding the continuation of the approach.
The aircraft maintained an altitude between 168 and 192 feet before and just Tripafter overflying the missed approach point (MAPt). Both pilots spent about 13 seconds attempting to visually locate the runway environment, rather than commencing a missed approach at or prior to the MAPt as required by the published procedures.
The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) manufacturer’s latest generation EGPWS equipment would have provided flight crews with an additional warning if aircraft encountered similar circumstances to the occurrence flight. Installing the latest EGPWS equipment on the occurrence aircraft would have required approved modifications.
At 1905:12.4, three seconds after the “500 feet auto call-out” was annunciated, the captain stated “um three hundred” while the aircraft was passing through 450 feet, and then the selected altitude was reset to 300feet.
At 1905:25.7, when the aircraft descended through 344 feet, the captain stated “…two hundred”. The selected altitude was reset to 200 feet and the aircraft kept descending.
The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the Magong runway 20 VOR approach was 330 feet.
When the aircraft descended through 249 feet, the first officer said “we will get to zero point two miles”.
At 1905:44 and at an altitude of 219 feet, the captain disengaged the autopilot (AP) and announced “maintain two hundred”. The aircraft then maintained its altitude approximately between 168 and 192 feet for the following 10 seconds.
At 1905:57.8, the captain asked the first officer “have you seen the runway”, and at almost the same time, the yaw damper (YD) was disengaged without the required announcement and acknowledgment by the flight crew of a change in system state.
The flight crew then had a conversation
for about 13 seconds attempting to locate the runway environment. - Ormai erano committed to land cause they were running on fumes - In the meantime, the altitude, course, and attitude of the aircraft started to conspicuously deviate from the intended settings, but there was no conversation between the flight crew regarding the aircraft entering an undesired state.
At 1906:11, both pilots called “go around” at 72 feet and both engine power levers were advanced. Two seconds later, the aircraft hit the foliage 850 meters northeast of the runway 20 threshold.
Ricordate: "Zè stanchezza!" - "No! zè stà 'n ..zzo!"?
Preistoria del servizio di linea svolto dai membri di condotta:
Captain/Copilot
Total flying time last 12 months 9
45 hrs. and 10 min./ 9
64 hrs. and 46 min.
Total flying time last 90 days 278 hrs. and 06 min./ 264 hrs. and 44 min
Total flying time last 30 days
100 hrs. and 59 min./ 88 hrs. and 55 min.
Total flying time last 7 days 22 hrs. and 18 min./ 22 hrs. and 35 min.
Total flying time last 24 hours 03 hrs. and 31 min./ 03 hrs. and 31 min.
Available rest period before occurrence 15 hrs. and 07 min./ 15 hrs. and 07min.
20 July: Sei tratte con inizio servizio a Kaohsiung alle 06:40 e fine servizio a Kaohsiung alle 15:02 (08h.22’).
21 July: Sei tratte con inizio servizio a Kaohsiung alle 14:20 e fine servizio a Kaohsiung alle 21:08 (06h.48’).
22 July: Sei tratte con inizio servizio a Kaohsiung alle 14:40 e fine servizio a Kaohsiung alle 22:13 (07h.33’).
23 July: Sei tratte programmate con inizio servizio a Kaohsiung alle 13:20…
E tutto a quote non superiori a F200-250 in mezzo a tifoni/temporali
QinetiQ’s biomathematical fatigue model System for Aircrew Fatigue Evaluation (SAFE) was used to assess, in part, the flight crew’s level of alertness and task effectiveness.
Cpt Performance: equivalent to that of a person with 0.034% blood alcohol concentration. Per l'FAA max per andare in volo 0,04
F/O Performance equivalent to that of a person with 0.017% blood alcohol concentration
Spero che a te per quel che riguarda il tema FTL vada meglio
Un particolare non irrilevante è che se fai questo discorso al di fuori del tuo ambiente di lavoro verrai preso dalla maggior parte per un viziato che fa discorsi da Bolscevico e che non ha capito che il mondo è cambiato, "è il mercato, bellezza!".
Il fatto che dipartimenti per definizione critici per la Sicurezza delle operazioni quali la Formazione in generale e l'SMS nell'ambito di qualsiasi Compagnia ( e non solo in alcune ) debbano rimanere autonomi e svincolati da qualsivoglia principio di "business" è un concetto che molti non addetti ai lavori considerano ideologico.
Eppure l'utente finale - tu lo sai meglio di me - è l'unico ad avere il potere di cambiare le cose o quanto meno di agevolare la spinta per il cambiamento.
C’E’ CHI DICE NO!
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...-training.html
Article in WSJ
starts
New United Air Pilot Training Could Raise Safety Bar for Industry
Latest initiative could have some impact on whether record low airline accident rates continue
By Andy Pasztor
Scusate la brevità!
Il barone Rozzo