Mutt,
A few more thoughts and comments on your thoughts ...
(a) "Legally we don’t have to account for line-up distances (FARs) and until recently we didn’t have the ability to do so."
I suggest that prudent corporate governance includes a requirement for the consideration both of
(i) what the FAA might or might not do in respect of AOCs and penalty actions, as well as
(ii) the potential for strict liability after a mishap, Conventions notwithstanding.
How can you suggest that you didn't have the ability to do so ? Australia, for many years now, has adopted a fairly pragmatic approach by doing some simple taxy/lineup tests with reasonable wheel/soft bits clearance margins. I have copies of the original correspondence between the initial operator and the regulatory authority in my patch and it makes for very sensible reading. Even if one didn't go to that extent, it is a very simple exercise to use a CAD add-on to simulate the same thing. Either way, sensible lineup allowances very easily can be derived. You don't need any legal coercion to do so - so long as your procedure is conservative with regard to Parts 25/121, then the System probably isn't going to be too concerned one way or another. But your pilots will be - and we really are only concerned about the accel stop accountability.
(b) "...(no contaminated runway regulations in the FAR’s)"
I don't work for any FAA-approved operators but .... are we confusing airworthiness with operational rules ? The main reason for a dearth of prescriptive rules for contaminant operations lies in the variability of the animal and the practical difficulties associated with making sensible and repeatable measurements for calculation purposes. An operator cannot just ignore the problem - operational requirements impose a responsibility to make some, albeit imperfect, attempt to maintain a reasonable level of operational safety. We all know that some operators chose to ignore some things, but that is beside the point.
.... and, always, one has to keep in mind ... what is your story going to be at the inquiry ?
(c) "You believe that the basis of takeoff calculations is flawed."
This misses the whole point that the AFM is about reference data, not guarantees. It is up to the operator to determine a reasonable balance between operational prudence (ie conservative application of the AFM data) and commercial drive (ie profit). The reality of level playing fields and the like is noted - but - you pays your money and you takes your chances. Leaning too far to the short term profit goal occasionally proves to be expensive after the event.
(d) "Airbus procedures.... use an optimized V-speed ratio for ALL takeoffs."
Thanks for the info. This equates to what we have all been doing all the way along - unbalance the field length (where the data is available) and use V2 overspeed, as appropriate, to maximise the RTOW for each takeoff scheduled. A matter of semantics ...
(e) "..Derate thrust below climb thrust."
In the event of climb derate the same philosophy ought to apply. That is, we don't really want to takeoff and then push the throttles up to go climbing ...
(f) "As for the 1000 feet pad....... where do we draw the line?"
What's a good pad ? Whatever you (corporately, and industrially) consider to be appropriate (for a host of reasons) and able to be defended after a mishap... is exactly where you ought to draw the line.... and, this discussion, naturally could be the subject of a very interesting thread ...
The engineer, to whom my tale related, was very clear in his attitude - 1000 feet was around about the minimum pad which he reckoned he needed to be able to sell this newfangled reduced thrust procedure to his flightcrews - pure and simple.
(g) ".. Ops Engs should have flying experience".
I empathise with you. I had the experience, a long time ago, of putting that sort of proposal to my then boss, who endorsed it wholeheartedly. His boss, in town, who had to make the decision (read "spend money"), then went on leave. You guessed it, my boss then sat in his boss' chair, assessed his own recommendation .. and then knocked it back.
However, such experience needs to be relevant. In my case, a colleague and I, in similar jobs, had bare commercial licences and we, well-armed with the full ignorance of excessive youth, knew that we knew everything. The heavy aircraft ops engineer needs to have a reasonable amount of line experience for the flying thinking to be of much relevance. Thinking back to my earlier career, I can recall a couple of very wise airline performance engineering managers who went down a somewhat different pathway to overcome the practical difficulties associated with the ops engineer not quite understanding what the real world of line operations is all about. They actively courted flight operations management, established open dialogue, and a reasonable outcome resulted. I still believe that their approach produced some very very practical escape procedures, for example.
[This message has been edited by john_tullamarine (edited 30 May 2001).]