Tourist,
“… automation reduces skill levels.”
The NASA report
The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit concluded
‘… that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.’
Thus what might be observed as weak stick and rudder skills actually represent problems with cognition.
This view may also be reflected in a recent Airbus presentation criticising the regulatory focus on training/checking vs the need to learn (cognitive exercise?). Also, that Airbus training now considers manual skills sequentially with the management of the ‘automated’ systems (cognition); this could provide a better understanding of what technology/automation provides and how to manage situations when the technology is unavailable.
Expectations; … consider the assumptions which we make, e.g. in many accident threads, posts often state “I cannot believe how they (accident crew) did not see, could not do,” …. This is reflects the posters assumptions – the expectation that the crew should have been able to see, do, etc, based on hindsight and that all crews will behave in a rational manner in all circumstances.
Similar assumptions are embedded within regulation, crews are expected to be aware of an audio stall warning, whereas in unprotected aircraft a stick-shake may be more effective; crews are expected to be aware of a high nose attitude, but with plan continuation bias are reluctant to lower the nose because they pulled up, whereas a stick-pusher could be very effective.
We should continuously review our expectations, and the basis of our beliefs.
We need to learn from incidents and accidents; not via biased hindsight, but by reconsidering the underlying assumptions in the event. This involves 'double loop learning' –
“… the modification or rejection of a goal in the light of experience, … it recognises that the way a problem is defined and solved can be a source of the problem.”
Also, by James Reason
Diagnosing “vulnerable system syndrome”.
A conclusion is that we need to recognise that there is a limit to human ability; identify and reduce the contributors and circumstances of the limiting conditions, and in parallel maintain a high level of human performance, with the focus on cognition, - understand the situation before acting.