Systems and components rarely break leaving aircraft unflyable. It's the management of these failures that generally causes the problems. Our current training regimes have been pared back so much that we typically only concentrate on flying the aircraft automatically. But in real life, this is not always appropriate. Furthermore, many airlines prohibit manual flying and mandate full use of the automatics. BA is a case in point. Their Airbus fleet does (did?) not allow the use of manual thrust (see cowl flap incident at
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/airc...oe-24-may-2013). And they are not unique it's just that they were the ones who were unfortunate enough to have had this lack of experience highlighted and BA are one of the better operators. Furthermore, human beings are not very good monitors of inherently reliable systems. In fact they are dreadful. Yet our regulatory overseers expect us to look harder and pay more attention! So yes, you can say it was 'pilot error' but this really glosses over the bigger problem. The big problem is too little is being done to help the Mark I pilot operate in a fully automated world flying incredibly reliable equipment. The average pilot is not trained sufficiently to deal with the startle factor and the immediate consequences of that failure. At the same time, some of his basic skills will have so rusty through lack of practice they are basically useless. Fix these and we might all be safer.
Enjoy the repeats.
PM