Trouble about the go/no go decision is that it can never be reduced to a simple yes/no answer. There can always be extenuating and complicating circumstances.
If the Concorde crew perceived the full nature of their problem before rotate, would they have elected to abort beyond V1 and overrun, or continue and suffer their ultimate tragic fate?
Another case-in-point was a USAF (I think) aircraft that was departing an airfield in Alaska in winter. The Captain aborted the takeoff slightly above V1, overran the runway and the final result was the deaths of about 30 of his 100 passengers. After the event the Captain said that "something just didn't look right". The investigation team subsequently found out that one of his brakes was binding and that he never would have achieved rotate speed - his actions meant the difference bewteen running off the end at 60 knots versus running off the end at 120 knots.
The moral - the answer to the go/no go question is never easy. Those entrusted with this responsibilty have (hopefully) had enough experience such that, when the big test comes, they can make an almost instinctively correct decision.