-----so nothing reckless here, except you maybe unable to read a whole topic before replying to it !
Sir737,
Believe me, I have read every post on this thread multiple times, with some amazement, starting with the strange idea that there was some time in recent air transport history, before which we did not have to comply with aviation law --- is close to the Top 10 in all time ridiculous statements on pprune.
As for recklessness, I have merely used you own words to point out what you have said is you/your company’s practice, in law, is as good a case of evidence of recklessness as I have seen in a while.
In this area, there is no significantly new law, just developments from time to time. What is relatively new is both Boeing and Airbus making much more data freely available as “advisory” information , as an aid to planning operations.
Please be clear, such advisory material does not replace the position of statutory requirement. One poster has helpfully posted the FAR Part 121 statutory requirements, which are quite clear, and are not superseded by any apparently less restrictive advisory material. Don't forget that, in some jurisdictions, the that head and tailwind components used in deriving the published landing field lengths are also factored, half the headwind and double the tailwind.
Read the very clear disclaimers in the Airbus information helpfully provided in links on this thread.
The EASA regulatory framework is fundamentally the same, as is EASA derivation of statutory landing field lengths.
The idea that, in pre-flight planning for a statutory eventuality, you can plan on the use of a runway that you cannot legally use ( land and stop within the confines of the runway), except in extremis when you have no choice but to land anywhere as fast as possible ---- which would be pretty much limited to a catastrophic fire or fuel exhaustion, is something I have not ever come across before. A mere engine or systems failure, even multiple system failures, short of the immediately foregoing, does not change the statutory requirement to have adequate runway available.
And, as a minimum, that will be 1.67 times the raw data, if that is your staring point
If, in fact, your company manuals apparently permit a lesser field length, the manuals are wrong, and should not have been approved, or (as is possible in Australia, the representative of the approving authority is seriously deficient in aviation knowledge) have been approved in error, or are being misinterpreted. Over a long career, I have seen all the above happen, but so far such gross errors (in my world) have been picked up (several times by me) before an avoidable disaster resulted.
As to my legal knowledge, those who know my actual identity would testify that my background legal knowledge is of a different order to the “average” professional pilot, including understanding statutory and case law on criminal negligence and criminal recklessness.
Hopefully it will be more helpful if we look at the background to all this, and it is clear to me that that there is considerable confusion of terms, with the role of much “advisory” information not clearly understood -- in the legal sense.
In other words, the use to which much “advisory” information can be put is being apparently seriously mishandled.
Not, probably, with criminal intent, but nevertheless, ignorance is not a defence in any court of law, much less the court of public opinion, to which politicians and some brands of airline management will respond.
For landing field length --- the ones that you have to use in all your normal planning, and the ones derived by either FAA FAR 25 certification, or the JAR/EASA equivalent, the “published” landing field length, is the raw data (obtained from test flying at certification) multiplied by 1.67. In reality, this has been expressed, for years, as the “demonstrated landing distance” being 60% of the published landing field length.
For clarity, I have not used acronyms.
Understand, very clearly, that whatever you are planning, whether pre-flight or inflight (except in an extreme emergency) the full 100%, not 60% of the landing field length must be available. The applicability of an additional 15% ( or raw data multiplied by 1.92) is (depending on the FCOM) usually at the discretion of the PIC.
However, as one of the links on a previous post so helpfully illustrates, the FAA has decided (along with EASA help) that 15% (1.92) is not enough under certain circumstances, FAA ARC has made recommendations, and a rulemaking is pending, the NPRM is not far away.
In my opinion, one area of confusion is what (at dispatch) “demonstrated 60%” means in practice. Legally it can mean only one thing, and I will use an example.
At the time the aircraft might arrive at an alternate ( to departure, destination or en-route), given all the circumstance, weight, met. etc., and the aircraft landing field length published is say, 5000 feet (easier than meters) that makes 60% a distance of 3000 feet. However, the statutory distance you must have is still 5000 feet minimum.
The alternate (for whatever purpose) at dispatch cannot be a 3000 ft runway. The only meaning in a dispatch guide of the reference to “60%” is to the raw number, you cannot use that in operational planning, or in flight.
In an extreme emergency, all bets are off, but otherwise statutory (“published” as in raw by 1.67) landing field length is the minimum.
Where Airbus and Boeing now publish all sorts of very helpful advisory information, which is a good guide to what the aircraft will actually achieve, in practice,(which hi-speed can I make) based on autobrake settings and use of reverse, for example, plus assumptions about real runway friction condition (and what other variables you might throw in) you will often see the result “factored” by 15%. That’s fine, as long as you understand that the resultant actual runway length available cannot be less than the statutory requirement.
These “recent” developments actually have a long history, going back to the BCARs and the UK ARB of the 1960s. The then UK flight test model sought to allow for the real world of line pilots flying line aeroplanes in line conditions.
The flight test guide required testing at a variety of Vref ++ over the 50’ fence, a variety of threshold crossing heights, and a variety of flare and landing techniques. The resulting landing field lengths were factored by “only” 15%.
In practice, the BCAR results (raw/demonstrated +15%) were almost the same as the FAA Flight Test Guide figures, and the FAA method of obtaining raw figures was more straightforward and more repeatable, if more brutal. I don’t know, but I have always assumed that JAA went along with the FAA. At the time, I was a little surprised when such practicality overrode the usual trans-Atlantic politics of differences for difference sake. This from an old mate of mine who, after the USAF, spent many years with McDonnell Douglas Flight Test at Longbeach, involved in both DC-10 and MD-11 certification in both US and in Europe.
This is a very long post, I hope some of you will read this far, this is a subject on which all pilots should be very clear.
Please understand that statutory landing filed lengths are the minimum, advisory information, including performance estimates in non-normal configurations, is very helpful, but except in an extreme emergency, you must meet the statutory requirement as a minimum.
You may, indeed, need much more, that is the role of the advisory material, but not less. The A-380, QF 32, at YSSS is a good example.
Tootle pip!!