Perhaps the committee of manufacturers and regulators should consider the detrimental effects of using PIREPS when investigating the shortfall in landing performance.
PIREPS are inherently subjective and restrictive. In addition, they can be very compelling because they originate from a fellow pilot, even if only given for info.
If the runway is slippery and thrust reverse is used with autobrake, then there is no reliable way for the crew to judge the braking action. Any assessment of braking action depends on the decelerating systems used, their selection and setting, and the aircraft characteristics. The range of variables is so great that there is little or no value in the reports.
PIREPS are also subject to reporting bias; having landed on a runway where the achieved performance was very much less than anticipated, perhaps there is a tendency to report medium/poor thus avoiding any embarrassment in acknowledging an error by reporting poor braking action.
The TALPA recommendation was for PIREPS to be used only to downgrade the braking action, but AC 25-32 appears to accept them as primary information.
The FAA should look to other inconsistencies in information and definition; whereas TALPA follows the ICAO definition of a dry runway, AC 25-32 appears to redefine it such that 25% of a dry runway can be wet or worse, which is not conducive to safety if landing on a limiting runway.
In addition to the accident / incident data which triggered SAFO 15009, the committee could also consider those EMAS overruns which were not investigated (previous thread somewhere?); add to that those overruns into an area where the aircraft could taxy out (how many of those), and the number of landings where the stopping distance was longer than calculated / anticipated.
What were the factors in these incidents?
A timely SAFO.