There is constant talk that pilots need to have an in-depth knowledge of the automatics and a precise understanding of how to use them: i.e. what to use & when to achieve a specific task. That is often covered by SOP's; but in my experience those who use rigid SOP's teach only a small fraction of the options available. Discretion, judgement, often common sense has been diluted by those rigid procedures. As a result only those portions of the automatics necessary to comply with the SOP's are taught. When things go awry, be it nature, ATC or gremlins then many pilots are left clueless. Those other capabilities remain a secret, or there is a belief they are not allowed to be used; in violation of SOP's!
Now basic handling: the TR courses include a very rudimentary basic handling introduction. The same old items that existed in steam driven jets. Look at the LST syllabus form; it's from the dark ages. The only real handling done regularly is raw data ILS, a loss of thrust ILS & G/A & landing, and a low level disconnect on finals after a circle. The rest, turns, steep turns, access/decel are a one off. That's it. After that it's autopilot with FD on. No wonder the students' scans are so below average; they don't have the education.
However, it was the same in B732 days for the TR courses, but the big difference is we went on to the line and flew manual visuals at every opportunity. It was the norm! Thus the skills that had been 'introduced' in TR were honed on the line by practice & repetition. (I'm not in agreement that flying manual in climbs & descents to/from high FL is a real benefit.) It was the last 10,000, manually, into the circuit on to aid-less rwys that taught you the most. ILS's with decent vis & OK cloud base were flown manually. Thus we could 'feel' the a/c and keep scans sharp.
When we went onto EFIS a/c it was astonishing & wonderful, but we (those who bothered) kept those old scan skills sharp and didn't let the FD become god. It was a tool to be used when useful. The culture of visual manual approaches continued. We had foundations and the sensible few kept them in good maintenance. With little use decay would creep in subtly. Dangerous. So, when HAL went AWOL or 'walkabout' we knew it and knew what to do about it. The best computer on the a/c was always between our ears. The rest were tools. Decisions were still made 'upstairs'. We knew what level of automation to use and were not afraid to disconnect. (no children of the magenta line syndrome)
What is missing today are those foundations. After the TR courses the closest many get to real handling is base training; but once that is over many don't allow such cowboy flying anymore and then some pilots even become scared to try. OFDM will be watching. OFDM is a good thing, but any decent pilot shouldn't go any where near their triggers. Airbus seem to have woken up to this lack of foundation, but adding more handling to the TR course will only be a solution IF it is carried through onto the line. Therein lies the problem. XAA's can stipulate all the content of the TR's but they can't, or won't, interfere with line SOP's to the extent of manual flying. That is an airline culture, and with most being under the thumb of accountants and not pilots, don't hold your breath.
Back to knowledge of the automatics: IMHO there is not enough REAL education about what major screw ups the automatics can create and what to do about it. (Boeing non FBW). I realise the FBW a/c can be real bucking broncos if they get crossed wires and have a bad hair day. How much the airlines can train in the initial TR is limited otherwise information overload will happen. But, within a 3 year period, IMHO all the nasties and traps should have been experienced; certainly before command is gained. There has to be 1 person on the FD who has seen all this chaos. This needs careful planning of an educated recurrency training, not just tick in the box exercises.
When allowed, I often used to write recurrency training based on real life events. How many airlines have introduced an AF or QZ scenarios in their sim training; even the XL icing problem?
There has to be a very deep fundamental review of TR content and the testing there-of. That has to start in the XAA's as they sanction them for national/EASA licence standards. Is it happening or, is the risk of these events happening, within an acceptable frequency? How many incidents occur that nearly become accidents, and as a result we don't hear about them and the rose tinted glasses stay firmly in place? This is such a critical & vital debate to have, and a sound conclusion reached. The future of pilot training, a/c design and the safety of future passengers depend on it.