Back to Helmand Province 12 months on

[skridlov]

History repeating itself

I'm not ex-, or current- for that matter military. Firstly I offer my thoughts with due respect and gratitude for those who have fought, suffered and died in this exasperating conflict in the attempt to drag the place into something resembling a "normal" country. I have however been to Afghanistan for a few memorable weeks - in 1973, en route overland from UK to Oz - and I've read a small library of books on the country and its history, including Rory Stewart's.

I'd recommend anyone with the time and interest to read William Dalrymple's "Return of a King", his account of the first Afghan war which began in 1839 and ended in absolute disaster, the first of three futile engagements. The parallels with the current situation and the hopeless blunders that led to it are almost unbelievable. Of course given that the ethnic mix and tribal nature of Afghan society, combined with the ignorance of the politicians attempting to manage the conflict are little different today than they were >150 years ago, this is less surprising than it might be at first glance.

For an illustration of the political mis-management of the Afghan operation "Cables from Kabul" by Sherard Cowper-Coles (his name might lead you to guess that he was the former UK ambassador to Afghanistan) is a useful introduction - but not necessarily in the way the author may have intended. It's also well worth reading an account of the Soviet experience there such as "Afghantsy" by Rodrick Braithwaite and to recall that the Soviet installed government managed to hang on for a couple of years of civil war after the troop withdrawal despite having nothing resembling the resources we've donated to the current Afghan government - minus those that have been purloined or sold to the Taliban of course.

In the west's urgency to win the cold war we allowed vast amounts of resources to be poured into the very Afghan mujahedin groups who most despised everything we represent - just as much as they despised the "godless communists". These predominantly Pashtun groups - Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami for one - were thereby the incubators of all that has followed, including the rise of both the Taliban and Al Quaeda - and, I would argue, I.S. This was easily forseeable in the early 80s.

I think that the attempt to create an effective central government in Afghanistan was doomed from its inception, for a host of interwoven reasons, not least of which is that Afghanistan has never really been a unitary state. The idea that the Afghan security forces, comprised as they are from an overwhelming majority of Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek personnel, could ever be regarded as anything but an occupying force in Pashtun regions, is preposterous. The original plan for creating the Afghan army was supposed to be demographically proportionate - ie at least 40% Pashtun. As far as I'm aware this was a fantasy which wasn't even close to being attained even at the officer level.

I imagine that anyone who has served in Afghanistan, particularly in Helmand, must be tearing their hair out in frustration whilst watching the place thrash itself to bits. And recall that it was only a few weeks ago that Kunduz, in the extreme north, non-Pashtun, region of the country was completely under the control of the insurgents for a while. It's hard to envisage anything but a total collapse of the central government other than in a situation where the Taliban (as we must call the by now diverse membership of the insurgency) negotiate a power-sharing agreement. Which might be the only way to keep "Islamic State" out of the country, and that not guaranteed.