@Clandestino:
Of interest to me is dynamics of spatial disorientation in multicrew cockpits. We are not dealing with the amounts of G and angle rates of tactical jets, so it's harder for us to get to get disoriented yet again facts of the accident fly in the face of the notion that if one pilot gets his vertical gyro between the ears toppled, the other will come to rescue. It seems almost as if disorientation is contagious. In most of the similar accidents so far, captain was PF so we could take some solace in notion it was about command authority gradient yet here very experienced captain failed to perform recovery (or any decisive action at all) so it's back to square one for HF <human factors> research.
An interesting point that you put forward here.
Some rough first impressions...
When i think about the books on the subject of SD, it seems like they often, if not always, focussed on single pilots in one way or another. Part of that is probably because a lot of research has been focussed on single seat fighters. But even in multicrew situations, i get the feeling (have to start rereading stuff with your observation in mind) they translate lessons learned back to an individual pilot and/or primairily his set of displays.
First book that i picked from the shelf here and quickly checked, titled "Spatial disorientation in aviation" (500+ pages), appears to confirm this.
A question that immediately popped up was - what would (a statistical group of) PNF's INSTINCTIVELY do when their respective airplane experiences an upset:
a. do they first try to understand what the PF is doing, or,
b. do they independently assess the situation first,
Followed by the question:
If they start with either a. or b., how likely is it that they stay either in a., or in b., or move from a. to b., or move from b. to a. And how likely is it that a PNF switches more than once (like a. to b. and then back to a.), And within what timeframe and situation can they do what.
When you take the mentioned book as an example, you can immediately say that the answer will be in statistical terms. Even 'simple' disorientations are unevenly spread over pilots. Even if they have had the same selection process and exactly the same type of high quality training.
If i try to recall the AF447 CVR Captain statements, it appears that he started with point a. And i wonder if he really ever got to b. Would have to reread that too.
This again shows the importance of a full (AirAsia) CVR transcript by the way.
More questions than answers i am afraid.