It looks like a lot of smoke and mirrors and actually appears to have not a lot to do with the accident itself, simply the maintenance recording and operation, and that follows the general wording of the original fleet grounding in that it inferred more a maintenance grounding than an aircraft failure.
The maintenance organisation informed the AAIB that it considered the decision to extend the cartridge lives was taken within the privileges of its maintenance approvals and therefore it did not consider it necessary to seek formal approval from the CAA to extend the cartridge lives. The CAA stated that any extension of ejection seat cartridge lives would require written approval, and would be based on a technical justi cation and proof that new cartridges had been ordered.
And that appears to be a failing of the CAA in putting in place clear and unambiguous instructions, it does not surprise me as the CAA are a shadow of their former selves in that they have few qualified experienced aircraft engineers amongst their core staff.
They bleat on about how one must follow the maintenance programmes for the type, yet in another breath tell me I can ignore sections of the manufacturers maintenance manual, dangerous ground because once you take that stance it is open to interpretation by individual companies as to what they comp,y with and what they don't!.