I graduated from the USN fast jet school of training where I learned to overcome the sensation of sitting in a waste basket while I flew instruments and to fly intellectually-because your physical sensations were not to be trusted
Did you earn to fly limited panel IMC? Do students still at CPL still learn that skill? It certainly gave one an appreciation of what was going on and how to control it. It also taught you not to panic when you lost what had previously been perceived as a vital parameter. You calmly used other information to maintain control. If it has been removed from basic flying school IMC training then IMHO it should be re-introduced.
Has anyone attempted this in a modern jet? The worst I was ever given in recent recurrency was an FMC failure or flight on SBY (EFIS) display. Neither a big deal. An ILS with total unreliable airspeed is a good one, but rarely trained. As a trainer my dictated syllabus was very basic when displaying unreliable airspeed scenarios. A nice tick in the box for 3.4 system failures, but as a training exercise to 'save the day' when it happened for real, not so useful.
One of the best I had in a B757 sim was to fly an ILS on full old fashioned SBY displays. It became even better when the RMI went awol and we had to use the old fashioned compass. Again no big deal if you used the basics.
The absolute last thought I'd have with a stall warning is to pull back! Unload the wing FIRST. This is pretty basic flying.
I have to confess that when teaching stick shaker stall recovery I questioned the FCTM. It said "apply power & reduce attitude." It didn't say anything about minimum height loss. That was an exercise 'if ground contact was a factor'. I stressed to reverse the wording might be better, especially in underslung engines, to 'reduce attitude and increase thrust.' Split second, even both at the same time, but elevator leads the way. To me aerodynamics had not changed so why pretend it had. Beforehand I saw guys apply the thrust and then go closer to a full stall than they were. i.e. they made it worse before they made it better. After THY at AMS guess what happened. Aerodynamics and common sense won the day and FCTM was changed to UNSTALL the wing first.
One view of the problems being discussed is that the level of human experience is decreasing and the opportunities for gaining experience have significantly reduced.
Great comment, and then ask why & how? Let's get to the root cause of this demise and start to solve the problem there, not massage it and put a few sticking plasters on a gaping wound. It may need an operation or stitches, but there needs to be a serious reasoned debate from all parties. There appears to be a lack of leadership on that. Many interested parties are spouting words of wisdom, and some even showing disinterest. Will it be EASA, an XAA, ECA, IALPA, Boeing, AB, a government, an airline group, anybody, but it needs somebody to lead. There is a real problem and we are perhaps seeing the tip of an iceberg. A/C will evolve into more computerised sophisticated beasts; MPL cadets will be less experienced and thrust into RHS of said jets; companies will expand and give commands with less experience to meet that expansion; cadets will pay for their training and grab any job with any T's & C's they can find; rigid SOP's will evolve to reduce piloting skills. So how can the industry protect itself from a declining spiral of skills that could hurt it? We already know that there are airlines from certain regions that certain pax avoid due to suspicion of standards. We want to reverse that trend not allow it expand.