phylosocopter #3818, an interesting thought, where it would be logical to assume that pilots would have some exposure to alternate law. Yet the law is only an ‘alternate’ and does not, as AFAIU, pose any great difficulty in control; more so with protections in place.
A different question could ask if crews have been exposed to the situations where their apparent inability to fly in alternate law was noticed, but these are very rare and often unforeseeable. Why attempt to train every 1 in 10-9 event, which represents impossible reactive safety, we never catch up. Why not ‘ask’ (determine) how many pilots inappropriately (foreseeably) pull CBs in flight.
A different approach is to consider the problem at a higher level. The informative presentation
Managing Startle gives some well-constructed views of the human issues, but even then solutions to the ‘how to’ problems of imparting and refreshing knowledge, teaching and practicing SA, and need to plan ahead, are not outlined.
The underlying problem appears in both teaching relevant knowledge – ‘know what’ (but who decides on what is relevant), and the much more difficult acquisition of ‘know-how’ skills, when and where to use the knowledge.
From a previous post, you can provide knowledge of how to ride a bike, but you have to do ‘it’ to be skilful. What is the ‘it’ in flying (
not the hands on bit) that is so elusive, perhaps we have to get on our metaphorical bikes to find out.