Many thanks, Safetypee and RDMII, for enlightening discussion. SP: "unless there is a change in safety views and processes"; RMDII: "change in approach concerning the question, Why do "accidents" still occur?" What would such a change - or changes (plural) - look like? (and if that question seems impertinently stated, then, is it even a useful question to ask, "is the present system moving in the right direction for such change or changes to occur?")
The "How Complex Systems Fail" article (the link to which SP provided) is at least 15 years old - can't help but wonder, how have any more current analyses looked at the overall complexity construct?... any differently, or differently in ways relevant to the general subject matter of the thread?
Also couldn't help but note a slight, not objection, but "reservation" about seeing ICAO Annex 13 as an "oversight" process or method relative to nationally-authorized safety boards or agencies (but it's not too important to discuss further right now).
Reading comments by RDMII & Safetypee over again, was reminded of the not-too-long ago ICAO Loss of Control In-Flight Symposium (May 20-22, 2014). Exclusively in the interest of contributing, possibly, to the discussion of safety improvements (however difficult those may be to identify, enunciate and make happen), much info apparently very relevant to observations by prior posters is listed in the Symposium program and Key Outcomes (presentation powerpoints also can be accessed - though lacking the intensity of videos of flight parameters - slides only).
The program for the Symposium:
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Do...enda_FINAL.pdf
and Key Outcomes:
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Do...20Outcomes.pdf