Quote, "Any idea if the 350 "RAAS" is the same as installed in some Boeings? If (big if) it uses the same or similar logic there should have been a couple of aural prompts before spooling them up."
Wiggy,
I'm not an Airbus bloke, but I believe RAAS is a 3rd party system and therefore should behave similar in all aircraft types.
What I'm guessing happened here is that they inadvertently loaded 22L into the perf/take-off init page of the FMC's. Upon holding short of 22R, RAAS would have stated "holding short runway 22R" as expected. When lining up on the runway the RAAS would again, as expected, have stated "on runway 22R".
If they had departed from the same runway as loaded in the FMC that would have been the last call out they would have received from the RAAS under normal conditions, (The exception being in case of an abort when the system would announce runway distance remaining in 1,000's of ft).
The problem would occur when you start to move down a runway above a certain speed that is not the runway you have loaded into the FMC take-off init page, it then logically assumes you are attempting take-off from the wrong, potentially shorter, runway and announces repetitively, "on runway XX, on runwayXX" to warn the crew of the error.
In this case it would have been a case of "no harm, no foul", since the runway 22R is in fact longer than 22L, but the crew had no way of knowing for sure what the error was and wisely chose to abort.
This is of course just speculation on my part, but I think it's a highly likely scenario.