unfathomable, unthinkable or unspeakable?
It appears that some very important questions are either being politicised or deliberately ignored so I'd like to ask if anyone is willing to simply apply robust airmanship without prejudice or agenda to any of the following?
***
The commonalities between aspects of this accident and AF447 raise some questions which, however obvious, ridiculous or otherwise they may appear, simply cannot be dismissed IMHO:
1. Was the PF of either accident aware they were operating the aircraft in a degraded FBW condition (e.g. alternate law)?
2. With what degree of certainty can we know the answer to question 1, above?
3. Did anyone in the flight deck verbalise or otherwise communicate the change from normal to alternate law, regardless of the obvious cues/indicators etc?
4. Given the PF's action of moving the sidestick fully aft [in both accidents] is arguably more rational in Normal law, how can we be certain that all bus drivers are proficient and/or confident operating in degraded FBW conditions, in all phases of flight, irrespective of the answer to question 1, above?
5. Assuming each PF commanded a stall unintentionally, and maintained the stalled condition unintentionally, is there a possibility, however remote one may wish that to be, that operating in a degraded FBW condition is one layer of complexity too many when faced with the deteriorating situation each found himself in (i.e. swiftly decreasing altitude with nose up attitude, unreliable or decreasing airspeed, stall warnings etc), especially considering the same action of full aft sidestick does not have entirely the same effect in each law?
***
We have to assume that neither PF intended to mush into the drink from cruise and are therefore faced with a reality in which two pilots applied full aft sidestick in the belief that doing so would command a climb/arrest his rapid descent/recover the situation. The only logical explanation for such an action is that the PF either:
A> was unaware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition
B> was aware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition but did not understand that applying full aft would not have the same effect as doing so in Normal law
C> was unaware he was applying full aft sidestick or was gripped by fear/other human factor
I can think of no other logical explanations for applying full aft sidestick and therefore, as we have 2 instances of this occurring, I believe we are able to derive some conclusions and make some recommendations in order to help prevent further recurrence. Explanations A> and B> above can be mitigated by:
I> Removing any element of doubt about which FBW condition/law one is operating in at any given time
II> Removing any element of doubt about what the correct course of action is during an upset in the law/FBW condition one is operating in at the time
III> Training crews to operate the aircraft in all FBW conditions/laws in all phases of flight
I'll leave mitigating C> above for the interesting 'human factors' discussion ongoing on these and other pages, but the point is that action can be taken, in numerous/varied guises, to address some of the concerns arising from some of the similarities between this and the AF accident.
And even if one takes the view all of this is too simplistic, or not necessarily relevant, there is little harm in doing all possible to ensure one more PF doesn't hold full aft sidestick all the way to his, his colleagues and his passengers' premature doom.
IMHO.