When warship programs are justified because they sustain the shipbuilding base; when people shrug their shoulders and say "whatevs" about the value of the V-22 or F-35B, because they believe that Marine influence is such that they will be bought anyway; when you can't touch bases or depots that eat a disproportionate amount of the budget; these are all cases where the MICC is manifest.
Eisenhower's concern at the time was more with the growth of nuclear arsenals, which at the time threatened to go geometric. He knew, but most people did not, that the "bomber gap" of the mid-1950s was hooey, a combination of bad intel and deliberate marketing promoted by the General Turgidsons of SAC and the industry. (The U-2 had demolished it, but that was secret.) His administration was being beaten up on the "missile gap", which was little better founded.