In response to LO's point of "Strategic mis-step" I mentioned that what has been going on with F-35 may be symptom of a larger acquisition issue. What follows is triggered in part by my recollection of what sank the A-12 (A-6 replacement): how much risk was built into the program and how successful the gov't/contractor combination was in overcoming or mitigating each element of risk. (As with Comanche, the program was unable to succeed). This theme repeats itself across platforms, or so it seems to me. Let's look at high tech, or "new generation" naval vessels to illustrate the larger acquisition and strategic point.
The Zumwalt starts sea trials.
Eric Wertheim, author and editor of the U.S. Naval Institute's "Guide to Combat Fleets of the World," said there's no question the integration of so many new systems from the electric drive to the tumblehome hull carries some level of risk.
Operational concerns, growing costs and fleet makeup led the Navy to truncate the 32-ship program to three ships, he said. With only three ships, the class of destroyers could become something of a technology demonstration project, he said.
At a price tag of about 4.5 billion a piece, can the Navy actually afford a "technology demonstrator?"
At a price tag of 100 million a piece, can the USAF and USN and USMC afford a strike aircraft that will likely become less "stealthy" as the tech on the sensor side also improves? (Yeah, it's a form of an arms race, isn't it?)
In both the F-35 and Zumwalt
a low observable (electronic at least)
core design is a hard requirement. Each was approached in its own way within the context of the program. (I suspect that the electric drive may reduce the Zumwalt's acoustic signature, but that's getting away from the point of raising this program). **
In both cases, the cutting edge or bleeding edge capability is being pursued, and each design will be optimized for (fill in the quality or feature that you think here) ________. That brings with it both a program risk, a tech risk, and a price tag that is eye watering.
It seems that twenty years later that what we've arrived at is what happened with the Seawolf Submarine: what started as a program for 29 ended up as three, and they were the most expensive submarines built to date. That program started in the early 80's and didn't get underway until about 1997.
Does this sound familiar?
So what is it that these cutting edge, bleeding edge "5th gen" platforms are being optimized for? It appears that in the case of the F-35, the close in fight isn't it from some of the early publicly available feedback on BFM. Beyond the "we are stuck with this, press on" imperative, I seem to hear an echo from some other programs.
The USAF could not build the full run of the original C-17 buy(200+) but they didn't cancel the program and did recover from the low point of 80 something to get more than 100.
The USN could not build the full run of Seawolf, but did not cancel the program.
They USN could not build the full run of Zumwalt, but did not cancel the program
F-22's fate was similar to C-17: original run truncated.
The Departments of Air Force and Navy may not be able to buy or build all 2000+ F-35's (I had thought the original number was nearer 3000, but memory does not serve) but there is no sign of cancelling the program.
On the strategic level, that might make more sense than on a single program's merit. It might not be a mistake at all. What I see as being optimized has little to do with the detail of war fighting and all to do with the capability to do so. What looks to me as the underlying theme is the need to support the industrial base to build ships and aircraft, and within that larger aim improving the state of the art in X sub systems of these platforms.
To answer post number 1: No, the F-35 won't be cancelled. The only question is how many will ultimately show up on flight lines in various nations. Keeping the capacity and ability to build advanced aircraft of this sort is apparently a strategic imperative.
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** = They are calling this a destroyer and it is 600 feet long. When I was on Ticonderoga class cruisers (which was derived from the Spruance Light Cruiser Hull that became a Spruance Destroyer Hull with a pencil whip back in the 1970's) was 560-570 long. I am not sure just what this ship is.